



Daily Report

East Europe

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NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

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French Proposal on Balkans To Be Disclosed

LD0412134095 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1309 GMT 4 Dec 95

["Pool" item by Momcilo Pudar]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Paris, Dec. 4 (TANJUG)—France has proposed a pact for stability in the Balkans, assessing that peace in the region will be fragile and vulnerable unless the Dayton Accord is propped by more comprehensive agreements.

The proposal will be disclosed at the peace conference in Paris, scheduled for Dec. 14, or the following day at the European summit in Madrid.

The aim of the pact is the development of good neighborly relations, a highly sensitive task as the conflicting nations in the former Yugoslavia are just about emerging from the tragedy of war.

The basic principles of the pact would be a mutual pledge not to use force, to settle all inter-state disputes peacefully, respect for internationally recognized state borders, accepting international arbitration and strict recognition of constitutional and other rights of national minorities.

The architect is former French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, who described the pact as an attempt to prevent an outbreak of fresh conflicts by settling problems through negotiation, particularly issues pertaining to borders and national minorities.

Last March, Balladur, then prime minister, assembled the European heads of government for the signing of a pact on European stability. The leaders of the conflicting Balkan countries were not invited.

A new pact, for the Balkans, is now on the agenda, as part of the continental pact. The stand is supported by European countries and the United States.

Balladur mentioned separately the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania as necessary members of the pact, bearing in mind current disputes.

The principle of the inviolability of existing state borders has been underscored, rendering untenable the idea of a greater Albania that strives to encompass the Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija and western parts of the FYROM.

Sources in Paris have said the pact has met with positive criticism in the Balkans. The architects said the U.S. and Russia would be invited to assume a certain role in the operation, though the European Union would have the central place in implementing the idea.

It is believed the E.U. can influence Balkan countries primarily with its stand that only countries showing a firm will to live in peace are eligible to join.

However, the E.U. has taken upon itself to be an unbiased partner, that would not impose the egotistic national interests of its leading members as overall interests for stability in the Balkans.

OSCE Acting Head: Dayton Agreement Must Work

AU0412211295 Paris AFP in English
2019 GMT 4 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Budapest, Dec 4 (AFP)—The Yugoslav peace accord "must work" and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] will have a major role in its implementation, acting president of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Laszlo Kovacs said Monday [4 December].

Its guarantees lay in the fact that the international community was not only determined to create an agreement but was also determined to force peace, "and it has the appropriate military force available for that", Kovacs said in an interview with AFP three days before an OSCE Foreign Ministerial meeting here.

The accord initialled in Dayton, Ohio a fortnight ago came about due to "coinciding interests" of the countries involved in the Yugoslav crisis and the international community, he said.

"The parties involved in the southern Slav conflict obviously got tired of senseless destruction.

"The involved countries and peoples suffered vast losses in human lives, material damage and lost revenues due to the embargo, and as this senseless destruction went on and on, the international community realised more and more that the conflict could escalate and that this is a time bomb which could explode any time", Kovacs said.

At the meeting on Thursday and Friday, the foreign ministers of the 53 OSCE member states would discuss how the organisation can strengthen peace in the Balkans after the Dayton agreement, "the first step on a very long road where we shall meet a legion of problems", Kovacs said.

He rejected criticism over the haste of Dayton saying that preparations for creating peace on the Balkans were going on with the appropriate efficiency.

"I think that the most essential thing, the political will of the three signatories and the international community, exists, and for me this is the most important. I find it a

secondary thing whether every single technical detail is prepared, and anyway, until the Paris signing, there are 10 more days to go. I think that the events proceeded in the right order", he said.

The OSCE plans to send several missions to ex-Yugoslav territory to watch the creation of the legal guarantees and the practical implementation of human and minority rights there, but the missions would closely cooperate with other international organisations and local forces, Kovacs said.

"OSCE should play the role of lead agency, but does not wish to play any of the roles alone", he added.

"There is, by all means, need for a mission" in Bosnia, which primarily will prepare, organise and keep a tab on the elections there, and continue to coordinate the activity of three ombudsmen Kovacs appointed for overseeing the human rights issues of the Serb, Croat and Moslem population of Sarajevo at the beginning of the year.

Under the plans, another OSCE mission would be sent to Croatia, and three former missions which used to work in the Vojvodina, the Kosovo and Sandzak regions of warring federal Yugoslavia would return there.

Another thing in which OSCE will have a special role and responsibility in the Balkans area is the elaboration of an arms and defence forces limitation agreement, which is "indispensable from the point of creating security in the region, and this is the competence of OSCE", Kovacs said.

Kovacs added that he did not expect that the large-scale NATO operation to kick off after the Dayton agreement is signed in Paris on December 14 would push aside NATO plans for an extension towards former Warsaw Pact member states in eastern Europe.

"I think that the two things are related the other way round. The Yugoslav peace arrangement process will not brake NATO extension. On the contrary, it will help create its organisational and cooperational conditions", he said.

He quoted the example of Hungary's participation in implementing the accord through offering logistics support: "This way, Hungary and NATO start a cooperation in very concrete area, a cooperation which is tighter than any earlier form of cooperation", Kovacs said.

Deputies Comment on Security Files Bill

AU0512085195 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE
in Albanian 1 Dec 95 p 3

[Unattributed report with excerpts from speeches by Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, Democratic Party; Fehmi Abdiu, Socialist Party; Azem Hajdari, Democratic Party; Pandeli Majko, Socialist Party; Teodor Laco, Social-Democratic Union; Perikli Teta, Democratic Alliance; Abdi Baleta, Democratic Party of the Right; Gjergj Raka, Social Democratic Party; Ali Spahia, Democratic Party; and Namik Dokle, Socialist Party: "Parliament Decides To Open the Files"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The law of the personalities of officials took final form yesterday in parliament. The majority of deputies voted in favor. The following are excerpts from some of the deputies' speeches:

Aleksander Meksi (Democratic Party): It is natural that we should be the ones to ask for the genocide that was carried out in Albania to be punished, and we have gained from the experience of Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Germany. I think it is immoral to defend the genocide that the dictatorship conducted. Some State Security Service collaborators were recruited by force, and it was natural that they should support democracy when it came. This law has been called anticonstitutional by the Socialist opposition, but how is this possible when the bill submitted by the Socialist Party in 1992 on opening the files envisaged that the mandates of deputies with files would be withdrawn. Yet the bill they submitted was not unconstitutional, but ours is. Something else I want to say is that many files were destroyed between 1990 and 1992, and parliament will soon prosecute those who did this.

Fehmi Abdiu (Socialist Party): This new genocide reminds me of the moral measures that the Albanian Workers Party used to take. How can politicians' private and political lives be left in the hands of a few supposedly honest people who will become a court overriding all courts, although according to the Penal Code only the latter have the right to remove a person's right to take part in elections?

Azem Hajdari (Democratic Party): The approval of this law is a historic moment for today's parliament. This is another defeat for the Socialist Party, which has all the time spread propaganda alleging that the Democratic Party is revanchist and will bring fascism. This law will finally close the files.

Pandeli Majko (Socialist Party): They think that they have exposed the real culprits today, which in short means forgiving them. This law in fact proves that

there are State Security Service collaborators inside parliament and implicates us all simultaneously.

Teodor Laco (Social-Democratic Union): Various aspersions have been cast in the press and elsewhere, but when the time comes to expose the former snoops, there is nothing to be found.

Perikli Teta (Democratic Alliance): We agree with vetting official figures, but we demand that we should also participate in the commission that will examine the documents. This will be a parliamentary commission without a majority of any specific party. We also think that this bill should be discussed first in principle, but article by article only after a reply from the Constitutional Court.

Abdi Baleta (Democratic Party of the Right): I would normally favor the approval of this bill because I think that not approving it would be a greater evil. But how can people who are not vetted themselves vet the characters of future deputies? However, I think that the time to open all the files will come, just as the files on corruption will also be opened. I, therefore, ask in public, before this parliament, for my own file to be opened.

Gjergj Raka (Social Democratic Party): We agree with the opening of the files, but feel that even those who turn out to be collaborators should not be deprived of the right to be elected. It is said that there are at present 30 unsuitable people in parliament. How can these people discuss the deputies of the future?

Ali Spahia (Democratic Party): This bill is one of the most important in the Democratic Party's fulfillment of its promise that it will not open everybody's files but only those of the people who conceived the dictatorship and committed appalling massacres in our country.

Namik Dokle (Socialist Party): This law is a supplement to the Genocide Law, which we still call anticonstitutional.

Minister Says 195,000 Unemployed at End of 1995

AU0512092395 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE
in Albanian 1 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by Shpetim Luku: "The Unemployment Curve During the Transition Period"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Unemployment was the most severe social blight resulting from the economic transition and was explained during this period as a legacy from the past. Unemployment was swollen by the forced closure of many loss-making state enterprises, the forced dissolution of many cooperatives, farms, and agricultural enterprises, and the start of the privatization of

small and medium-sized enterprises. If about 30,000 people were reported as without work during the years of the planned economy, this figure ignored approximately 130,000 others who were only formally registered as working. The economic crisis of 1991-92 meant that unemployment rose to 27 percent of the able-bodied population and reached its highest point of 467,000 people. Unemployment has fallen continually since 1992. In 1993, unemployment was about 22 percent of the able-bodied population; it was 18 percent in 1994, and in 1995 the figure is expected to be about 15 percent. In the January-June 1995 period alone, unemployment fell from 268,000 to 254,000. According to Minister Dakli, there will be 195,000 unemployed at the end of 1995. The Land Law, whose enforcement made it possible to remove from the unemployment lists a considerable number of people who were granted land, was one factor contributing to a decline in unemployment. Statistics

show that about 90 percent of the people removed from the lists by the end of 1993 fell under this category.

Second, the Privatization Law led to the fast privatization of many shops and services, enterprises in agriculture and construction, and some industrial branches such as food, textiles, clothing, and leather and shoes. This stage in the reform made possible job creation within the growing private sector. At the end of 1994, employment in this sector had risen three and a half times compared to 1991.

Approximately 80 percent of the unemployed are in the towns, reflecting the inherited inefficiency of many urban enterprises. The mass privatization that has begun will also be the best remedy for the full cure of this social blight.

Observers To Go to Bosnia Within OSCE Mission

LD0512104495 *Belgrade TANJUG in English*
1001 GMT 5 Dec 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sofia, Dec. 5 (TANJUG)—Bulgaria is ready to send observers to Bosnia within the mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Tuesday's [5 December] Sofia press said quoting a Foreign Ministry spokesman.

The Ministry said that the Bulgarian observers would go to Bosnia only after the signing of the peace agreement in Paris in mid-December.

OSCE representatives have requested Bulgaria to provide experts for international and constitutional law, arms control and for monitoring elections.

During the civil war in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria consistently implemented a decision by its parliament not to get involved in any way, even as part of U.N. missions, in the conflict.

Inspection of Kozloduy Plant Reactor Completed

AU0412170795 *Sofia Khorizont Radio Network*
in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 4 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Committee on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy has allowed the 1,000-megawatt fifth reactor of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant to restart following an inspection by committee experts.

The fifth reactor was stopped on 23 August for planned repairs and refueling with nuclear fuel. Prestart operations are currently being conducted.

RDP Attacks BSP on 'Political Situation'

AU0412183995 *Sofia VEK 21 in Bulgarian*
No. 41, 29 Nov-5 Dec 95 p 2

["Viewpoint of the Radical Democrat Party's National Party Council on the Current Political Situation in the Country," adopted at the council's meeting in Plovdiv on 18 November]

[FBIS Translated Text] The current political situation in the country arouses serious concern regarding the Bulgarian people's democratic acquisitions.

The communist [Socialist] majority in the 37th National Assembly makes a pretense of being heavily engaged in productive work. In fact, this work consists of adopting laws on recomunization, most of which are justifiably nullified by the Constitutional Court as contravening the country's basic law. The days allocated to parliamentary questioning of ministers are systematically and method-

ically canceled, thus depreciating and profaning their role. For its part, the Bulgarian "National" Television only quotes the ministers' replies, without mentioning the names of the deputies who asked the questions or the what the questions were. In this way, the truth is hidden from the Bulgarian people that very often the ministers' replies have no relation to the questions that were asked. Despite this, the fact that on the eve of both rounds of the local elections, the majority canceled parliamentary question time clearly shows that the communist government of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] is afraid of the searching questions submitted by the deputies of the Right.

The RDP [Radical Democratic Party] is convinced that Bulgaria's integration into the European structures is unthinkable without Bulgaria clearly and categorically declaring its wish to join NATO. Although the SDS parliamentary group long ago submitted a draft resolution on this issue, and despite the fact that for months now this issue has been proposed daily for inclusion in the National Assembly's program, the BSP has blocked the settlement of this problem, with the result that Bulgaria is the only postcommunist country that has no viewpoint on the question of its NATO membership. The RDP demands speedy, purposeful, and united actions by the president, government, and parliament to get Bulgaria admitted into NATO, which must precede our acceptance into the EU.

The rulers are placing under threat Bulgaria's traditional and, until recently, universally acknowledged position as a stabilizing factor in the Balkans. They do not conceal their sympathies toward the most reactionary and militarist circles in rump Yugoslavia and their desire to build Slavonic, Orthodox, and other axes under the aegis of Russia. The politics of axes was renounced by world history long ago and is especially dangerous in regions like the Balkan peninsula.

The RDP characterizes as denigrating our national dignity and honor the toasts drunk in foreign embassies with the participation of people who represent themselves as intellectuals, but whose only aim is to glorify Russia and to revive its imperialist ambitions over the whole of the Slavonic world. At the same time, the BSP is reviving spy mania, xenophobia, and the most primitive nationalism. Brilliant examples of this are the vicious campaign against the "Open Society" and the attempts to create tension and foment conflicts on an ethnic and religious basis.

The BSP has failed to fulfill any of its election campaign promises and is demonstrating increasingly clearly that it is unable to govern in democratic conditions. Particularly obvious and especially painful to the population is

the BSP's utter failure to combat crime—both everyday common street crime and organized crime. The latter, as everyone knows, is an offspring of the former Communist Party and represents its second face. On top of all this, in the very first days following the local elections, there have appeared disgusting incidents of political violence committed by savage socialist cadres with the passive support of the local administration and the police.

The attempts by the government and the communist majority in the 37th National Assembly to make our national political life revert decades into the past are historically doomed to fail, but they can be stopped only by unified political action on the part of all democratically thinking people in the country. The RDP in Bulgaria will work unswervingly to achieve this unity of action.

The RDP National Party Council.

Plovdiv, 18 November 1995.

Dogan on DPS Leadership Changes, Zhelev Support

AU0412175695 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian
29 Nov 95 p 2

[Report by Galya Nikolova: "For the Time Being Dogan Will Not Replace His Deputies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 28 November Ahmed Dogan told reporters that the Rights and Freedoms Movement (DPS) national conference will take place in the spring. He said that the present moment is not suitable for changing his team, but did not deny that there are contradictions between him and his deputies.

A member of the DPS leadership told KONTINENT that Dogan intends to dissolve the Central Executive Bureau and lead the party single-handedly until the national forum, because he can no longer tolerate the contradictions in his team. However, the relatively good result the DPS achieved in the municipal election (26 mayors), has somewhat improved relations within his team and Dogan, not willing to intensify the discord within his organization, has decided to postpone his move, a member of the DPS leadership told KONTINENT. Nevertheless, Dogan told the reporters that he will renew his team in the spring.

Dogan explained the DPS' success in the municipal elections by the fact that its voters were shaken in December 1994. He stressed that he will thank the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) for its "nationalistic election campaign," and added that the Socialists have done him a great favor, especially in Kurdzhali. He accused the BSP of escalating ethnic tension in Kurdzhali. How-

ever, Dogan pointed out that between 1,500 and 2,000 Bulgarians in the region have voted for his candidate, Rasim Musa. Ahmed Dogan said that he will meet President Zhelev on the situation in Kurdzhali. His party will protest against the actions by Khaskovo Oblast administrator Angel Naydenov, who refuses to convene the newly elected Kurdzhali City Council because of the dispute regarding the election, and advised Rasim Musa not to administer to the city until the court rules whether he is a legitimate mayor.

The DPS national conference, which will convene in the spring, will determine whom the DPS will support in the presidential elections. Dogan pointed out that "the DPS, as an opposition, would err if it does not take into consideration President Zhelev's international authority as the founder of the Union of Democratic Forces." According to him, it is very important to have a united candidate of the nonsocialist forces. The presidential elections will be a great political, organizational, and financial clash of leftist and rightist forces, and therefore, the campaign began one year earlier, DPS leader Ahmed Dogan, said.

Draganov Views New Democracy Party's Goals, Role

AU0412181895 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian
30 Nov 95 p 13

[Interview with Orlin Draganov, deputy chairman of the New Democracy Party, by Yovka Dimitrova; place and date not given: "Orlin Draganov: New Democracy Has Nothing To Do With Bulgarian Business Bloc"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dimitrova] Mr. Draganov, why did you and the other two deputies who left George Ganchev's Bulgarian Business Bloc [BBB] decide to establish a new party?

[Draganov] We all see that the situation of the Bulgarian people and generally, Bulgaria, is not improving. Consequently, people with an alert human and political conscience must somehow react. Second, the BBB declared a program and its representatives entered parliament on the basis of that program; however, for certain reasons the BBB seems to be unable to implement its program. You cannot be identified with a certain program and simultaneously conduct a completely different policy.

[Dimitrova] Does it mean that New Democracy will implement BBB's preelection promises?

[Draganov] Our program differs from that of the BBB, but does not completely contradict it. New Democracy's program was composed on the basis of current developments and Bulgaria's future, while the BBB program

was composed five years ago, and many parts of it are no longer topical.

[Dimitrova] In other words, New Democracy is an alternative to the BBB?

[Draganov] No, we do not to be associated any longer with the BBB and its political leadership. New Democracy is an alternative for the entrepreneurs and the intellectuals, who have been placed in the corridor and do not receive the respect they deserve.

[Dimitrova] Are we to understand that the new party is a result of the fact that you feel insulted by George Ganchev?

[Draganov] You could say this, because we have never directly insulted the person of George Ganchev, despite the fact that he called us various names hundreds of times. The important thing is to know that we do not hate anyone and do not plan any revenge.

[Dimitrova] Do you plan to recruit the BBB members who feel disappointed?

[Draganov] After we complete our organization's structure we will conduct a sociological study of our membership. However, a large part of our members are people who have been kicked out or expelled by the BBB leadership. BBB was a commuter bus with one perma-

nent passenger—George Ganchev—and dozens of passengers who entered through the back door and alighted through the front door.

[Dimitrova] Who will be New Democracy's political partners?

[Draganov] All parties on the right of the political spectrum, because the business is in that part. We do not reject any of those parties, but we have yet to see who they are. Partnership with the left is out of the question. To support a single idea is one thing, but partnership is something completely different.

[Dimitrova] Why was the president the first politician you met? Is he the closest to your political views?

[Draganov] There is a certain hierarchy which must be respected. Regardless of President Zhelev's views, he is the head of state. Later on we will introduce ourselves to other institutions and diplomats.

[Dimitrova] Why did you, who profess rightist views, not join the People's Union or the Union of Democratic Forces?

[Draganov] We do not want to become an appendix. We can support the opposition, but we cannot disappear as an entity, image, or essence.

Commentary Emphasizes Obligations Regarding NATO*AU0512134395 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 30 Nov 95 p 3*

[Commentary by Jaroslav Huk: "We Are Confirming Our Affiliation With NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In its session yesterday, the Czech Government unanimously supported the deployment of our troops within the framework of the international forces under NATO command that are to supervise in Bosnia the observation of the Dayton agreements. President Havel also expressed his complete agreement with the Cabinet decision.

Prime Minister Klaus described the ministerial decision as the toughest they have ever made. Yes, it is the first time ever that we send our people to a real war conflict. After all, there is hardly anyone who would succumb to the illusions that no force will be needed to keep peace in the Bosnia cauldron. The Serbian leaders have been questioning the Dayton agreements already, and they perceive winter as a short-term interruption of the fighting, caused more by nature than by signing some agreements. As opposed to past operations in which Czech troops participated (Persian Gulf, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mission), our men will apparently come more than once into the field of sharp fire. On the other hand, they will also have the mandate and arms to behave like soldiers and fulfill the mission for which they were sent to the line separating the hostile parties.

The decision is doubtlessly correct that our government is offering the NATO command a fully armed and equipped unit. Our soldiers in the Persian Gulf and in the previous mission on the territory of the former Yugoslavia certainly did not give us a bad name. Nevertheless, only a completely combat-ready unit can demonstrate that we are an equal partner to the armies whose defense power we will require in the future. A unit composed of true professionals should be put in the service of the international forces under NATO command, which would not only do honor to the good name of our military units but further improve it.

In addition to the undoubted improvement in international prestige, the deployment of a unit in Bosnia serves another purpose. It is a sad fact that a policeman who would supervise the observation of agreements and peace accords is needed in the world even at the threshold of the third millennium. Nevertheless, we should be happy that there finally is such a policeman and that he is capable of fulfilling his duties. The Bosnian battlefield is hardly a predictable space, and its expansion to other territories cannot be ruled out. We are aware

of this new situation all the more because the northern border of former Yugoslavia is unpleasantly close to us. It is therefore in our own interest that the region does not become a permanent hotbed of war in the center of Europe.

Sending a unit of approximately 700-1,000 men certainly will not be free of expense. The cost of its operation will be covered from government reserves rather than Army funds. It is a good investment. The deployment of a unit in Bosnia will again, and significantly more, open the door to NATO for us. At the same time, there is no better recipe for our security than joining NATO with the status of full member. We have no right only to ask and let ourselves be protected. We have an obligation to invest and accept an appropriate share of risk and responsibility.

Romanies To Demonstrate Outside U.S. Embassy*AU0412140895 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 1 Dec 95 p 3*

[CTK report: "Romany Demonstration"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—A group of independent Romanies will demonstrate against the violation of Romany rights in the Czech Republic in front of the U.S. Embassy building in Prague on 10 December, Human Rights Day. According to their representative, Lubomir Zubak, the demonstration will be an alternative action to the planned demonstration of the Romany Civic Initiative.

Prime Minister Discusses Coming U.S. Visit*AU0512082795 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 1 Dec 95 p 3*

["Regular" interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Vaclav Musilek in Prague on 30 November: "The World Appreciates Our Acceptance Into the OECD More Than We Do"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, the regular interview with Vaclav Klaus is dedicated, above all, to his working visit to the United States that is just beginning. We also mention the significance of our admission to the OECD. Furthermore, the prime minister briefly summarizes his program for the last month of the year and comments on the process of selection of Civic Democratic Party candidates for the parliamentary and senate elections.

[Musilek] Prime Minister, what is the schedule for your visit to the United States, which is to begin shortly after this interview?

[Klaus] This visit is a combination of a series of lectures, the acceptance of various prizes [e.g., the James Madison Institute Prize], and meetings with the U.S. Administration. I will meet Defense Secretary Perry at the Pentagon, Acting Secretary of State Talbott and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke at the Department of State, and Anthony Lake, assistant to the President for security affairs, at the White House. That is a quartet that is apparently completely dominant now on the Bosnia issues. I believe that a better four people could not have been brought together for these talks.

[Musilek] Will you also meet American Czechs and Czech businessmen operating in the United States?

[Klaus] On Monday morning, I will have breakfast at an institution called the American Friends of the Czech Republic, which comprises various types of businessman of both Czech and non-Czech origin. Rather than Czechs, they are people who are in some way engaged in the Czech Republic. The next day, I will take part in the opening of a week's sojourn of Czech businessmen in the United States and open a seminar organized by the International Finance Corporation for Czech businessmen.

[Musilek] It will be the first time you will travel abroad as a representative of an OECD member state. You were congratulated by President Clinton on joining this prominent organization. Will OECD membership in some way affect your visit to the United States? Will there be some discussion about it?

[Klaus] I have the feeling that this action was somehow neglected in the Republic. I know that, when Mexico became a member before us, week-long celebrations ensued. The Czech pragmatic lack of ostentation, or perhaps restraint, simply leads to our getting over this as if nothing happened. I read a stance of the U.S. Department of State that states it considers the admission of the Czech Republic to be a milestone marking the first case of a postcommunist country being asked to join this key institution of the Western democratic states. The Austrian DER STANDARD wrote that it is the "most important achievement of the reform policy of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus since the political changes in 1989." It means that the world appreciates our admission far more than we do. It is good to travel abroad with this feeling.

[Musilek] We stand at the threshold of the last month of the year. Prime Minister, what will December 1995 mean for you? What about the budget?

[Klaus] Undoubtedly, this month will be about the budget, but also about the disputes regarding the date for the senate elections. It will also be about the preparation of election programs, and it will be the month of an important meeting with physicians at the Fifth Ordinary Congress of the College of Physicians in Olomouc next Saturday, where I want to deliver an address. For me, December will be the time of receiving a nice domestic prize, the Karel Englis Prize, at Masaryk University, and it will be the month of pre-Christmas actions. In the last week, I will have a meeting every day—one with artists, one with journalists, one with our businessmen, one with diplomats, i.e., it is a series of actions. It will be the month of pre-Christmas concerts, and so forth.

[Musilek] The approaching elections are beginning to intensify the political atmosphere, and, at this stage, it is, above all, a matter of a search for suitable candidates within the parties. The Civic Democratic Party congress approved five names as the leading personalities, as the Senate candidates. Nevertheless, 76 more must be found. Do you believe you can find enough suitable candidates of good quality who will be able to appeal to the public?

[Klaus] Many of these candidates are asking to speak. I smiled when I saw such an attractive card produced by one of our potential candidates. It bore a beautiful color photo of him and a list of all his merits, and was titled "Candidate for Senate." I realized then that there would be enough candidates.

[Musilek] It is expected that the struggle for nomination on the Civic Democratic Party slates will be tough. Some of the present deputies will not have it easy. At the congress, you warned against the election procedures becoming a formation of coalitions of those less capable against a strong candidate. Do you believe such instances are possible?

[Klaus] Such things can certainly happen, and we can feel that it is happening. It is a pity. On the other hand, it is clear that an election candidate must pass through what we refer to in short as the primaries. He must also persuade his fellows to name him; it is not enough to persuade the voters. In this respect, it is a legitimate thing.

Daily on U.S. Embassy Statement on Shifting Aid*AU0412134195 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
1 Dec 95 p 1*

[PRAVDA report: "They Left, U.S. Assistance Not Being Reduced"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Our daily reported yesterday on the termination of technical cooperation between advisers financed by the U.S. Administration and the Ministry of Privatization regarding direct company sales.

The U.S. Embassy in Bratislava reacted to this report yesterday because, "while the article appropriately renders the substance, it is necessary to clarify some points to avoid misunderstandings."

The U.S. Administration will continue providing experts for investment banking and finance through the newly established Enterprise Restructuring Center. According to the U.S. Embassy's reaction, the termination of the U.S. advisers' activity does not mean any reduction in assistance to Slovakia, but only the shifting of this kind of expertise toward direct support for the private sector in Slovakia.

The reaction adds that the amendment to the law on large-scale privatization has transferred a great part of responsibility [for privatization decisions] to the National Property Fund, and the question arose of whether it is expedient to have such a large team of U.S. advisers at the ministry. "The volume of direct sales based on recommendations of the team did not meet expectations to an extent that would warrant the extension of the contracts," the reaction states in conclusion.

Kovac Discusses Demarches, Economy, Kidnapping*AU0512091595 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech
30 Nov 95 pp 3, 5*

[Interview with Slovak President Michal Kovac by Tomas Chalupa and Michal Nosek; place and date not given: "I Would Like It Best If There Were No Demarches"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We interviewed Slovak President Michal Kovac on the most recent developments in his country, the methods being applied by the ruling coalition to exert pressure on him, and the possible repercussions for the Slovak economy from the Slovak Government's antiprivatization measures.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Mr. President, many citizens in the Slovak Republic and the Czech lands perceive you as the only savior of democracy in Slovakia. Do you

think you are strong enough for such a demanding and responsible role?

[Kovac] I think it is a slight exaggeration to talk about one constitutional official, even though he is the president, as the savior of democracy. The situation in Slovakia is not such that it is possible to talk about a grave threat to democracy. It really is impossible to view the president as the only savior of democracy.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] How do you explain this reasoning?

[Kovac] The president has more possibilities for addressing the public; he has many opportunities to defend democracy and criticize the potential measures and steps that represent a deviation from the path of democracy. The head of state is always more visible than some opposition politicians or, as the case may be, other fighters for freedom and democracy.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] The ruling coalition is clearly trying to oust you from office. It is exerting various pressures both in parliament and outside it. Do you think the Meciar government has sufficient strength and resources to realize its endeavors? How would the realization of these aspirations be reflected on democracy in Slovakia?

[Kovac] At the moment, it seems that there are no constitutional reasons for my dismissal, although enough deputies could be found who would be willing to vote for the proposal to dismiss me. First of all, however, there would have to be a matter-of-fact reason for this step—unless someone would like to assist in something that could be called a political trial, something absolutely contrived, as the case may be, a fabricated accusation that can be passed off as a pertinent constitutional article. At the moment, there are not 90 deputies here who would be willing to involve themselves in this. Not only is there no constitutional reason for my removal, there is also no constitutional means.

If I were to be dismissed without constitutional reasons, only on the basis of contrived accusations, this would cause grave damage to Slovakia's state interests. First and foremost, abroad. This would mean destabilization at home and, in all probability, fear would set in here. I cannot even imagine the kind of negative consequences this would bring for Slovakia's future development. Nevertheless, by saying this, I do not mean at all to overestimate my own worth.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] So, in your opinion, there are no matter-of-fact reasons for your dismissal. What other reasons are leading the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the coalition parties toward these endeavors?

[Kovac] This I can only assume because I do not see into the minds of the individuals and I do not know their personal motives. If we were to take into consideration certain statements, arguments, and reasoning, then the point is that I have a different opinion—a critical one—than the ruling coalition's representatives on a whole series of issues, and, at the same time, I am willing to talk about my views openly and make use of every occasion to do so before the public. I am not willing to conceal anything and embellish things, even in my conversations with our foreign partners, because such behavior would be ridiculous.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Prime Minister Meciar and various other HZDS members attack you through the media. Has such criticism ever been addressed to you directly?

[Kovac] Any criticism of me is mostly made in parliament or through the prime minister's radio and television appearances and very often also at HZDS rallies in sports halls. All of his exhortations are focused on my being absolutely unnecessary for Slovakia, on the fact that absolutely no one cares about me, and, therefore, I should step down. So far, there have been no specific talks between the Prime Minister Meciar and me, with the exception of a few private conversations in which we sought a common means of resuming communication. To date, no official suggestions have been made in this regard.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] A few days ago, Prime Minister Meciar expressed a willingness to hold discussions with you, but he said that this step has to be preceded by your self-criticism. What do you think this concept means? Are you willing to undertake such a thing?

[Kovac] I think that, at this moment, Mr. Meciar was thinking about the methods and means applied by the communist regime. If certain functionaries fell out of favor and were willing to stand up in public and subject themselves to self-criticism, then someone took pity on them and at least let them live. I apply self-criticism very often, the moment I realize that some of my steps have not been the best ones. I do not then insist on these things; I approach them differently, more responsibly. I do not think that everything I do is the best and that I do not make any mistakes. I do not know, however, in which respect I should still carry out self-criticism. Perhaps, in the respect that I should not criticize the prime minister's practices? In this case, I think — on the contrary — that this was correct, that it was in time, and, maybe, that it was even necessary to do so more thoroughly and comprehensively.

But, I see no reason for me to correct anything. I do not think that the president is untouchable. Every citizen, the prime minister, and the deputies have the

right to criticize anyone, including the president, but I distinguish criticism from the fabrication of various untruths, half truths, lies, denunciation, disparagement, slander, and so on.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] The attempts to dismiss you were one of the reasons for the formulation of the well-known demarche from the European Union. Do you think that the warning from the West is one the means of correcting the present government's policy in certain spheres?

[Kovac] I would like it best if there were no demarches, if there were merely acknowledgment of our government and appreciation of our constitutional officials. As president, I would certainly feel better in such a situation than in a situation in which we receive demarches. Unfortunately, however, I have to recognize that the demarches reflect some of our problems and that our future partners in the European Union are manifesting friendly concern in time so that Slovakia does not make its route into this organization complicated. They are pointing out certain things to us. Therefore, I do not condemn these demarches; I do not consider them to be unacceptable interference in our internal affairs but view them as a manifestation of sincere concern and interest.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] What is your opinion on the stance adopted by some ruling politicians on this demarche? The EU's step has even been compared to the practices of Hitler and Brezhnev.

[Kovac] When I gave some more thought to the reactions to the demarche, it occurred to me that it is not a tragedy if such a demarche is formulated because it was formulated in time and will not do Slovakia any harm or injury. It merely expresses certain concerns and criticism. It is not necessary to view this as a tragedy. I consider it to be more of a tragedy that those to whom this signal was sent are incapable of understanding what it is about, that they are factually privately convinced that everything they do is right and in harmony with democratic principles. At the same time, everything suggests that their notions about democracy and the notions of the European Union member states are very different. So, my concerns stem more from this disparity and from the fact that some of the erroneous convictions expressed by Slovak politicians could harm Slovakia objectively. I do not believe that the 15 European Union member states will accommodate our ruling coalition's notions about democracy, and I am surprised that, in our country, no thought is being given to the fact that we are the ones who have to adapt. I also consider the claims that the demarche was ordered by the opposition

or the president to be absurd. Neither the president nor the opposition has such influence.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] In the Czech lands, people rather often wonder out loud whether the statements made by Prime Minister Meciar and other government members, [Foreign] Minister Schenk, that Slovakia is striving for membership in NATO and the European Union, are not hollow. Whether there are no endeavors for more orientation toward the east of Slovakia's borders.

[Kovac] I think not. These statements are not hollow. Our politicians may indeed be privately convinced that they are doing everything well, but I am only saying that the tragedy is that, if they are privately convinced of the correctness of their decisions and, at the same time, are incapable of realistically analyzing the contents of the cautionary demarches, then they will be unable to adapt themselves to the kind of notions about the functioning of democracy that the European Union member states recognize. I do not think there is a deliberate strategy behind this, a strategy that, on the one hand, would represent to the public that we want to enter into the European Union and, on the other, would strive for something else by taking practical measures. This would mean remaining outside the European Union. I am convinced that no such deliberate endeavor exists. I am concerned that, unless things are thought through to the end, Slovakia may objectively find itself in involuntary isolation.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Slovakia has achieved rather good economic results in recent months. The forecasts that Slovakia will get into major economic difficulties are not, it seems, coming true. How do you explain this? Is this a manifestation of what some commentators are calling socialist rhetoric with a capitalist practice?

[Kovac] The well-informed economists who analyze the situation in the individual postcommunist countries certainly know that, for one thing, objective conditions have been created; this means that the recession has come to an end and that prosperity has set in. A consequence of this is increased demand, and there is an opportunity here to find a place on the market to a greater extent than during the recession. Slovak businessmen have also made use of this reality. Second, this is due to the fact that we have begun to achieve democracy and the transformation of the economic system. Business entities are free, relatively independent of state bodies, and have also been able to make use of these newly created objective conditions. Third, I think that a good macroeconomic policy has been implemented. The government and the National Bank of the Slovak Republic deserve kudos for striving for macroeconomic stability and for succeeding in lowering

inflation, increasing the foreign currency reserves, and creating favorable conditions for export activities. These are merely some of the factors that have to be mentioned in this context. As you can see, on the one hand, there are the objective circumstances that have been made use of, and, on the other, there is the fitting macroeconomic policy of the government and the National Bank of the Slovak Republic.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] In your opinion, how may the suspension of privatization be projected onto this positive economic development?

[Kovac] All of this may, unfortunately, manifest itself very negatively. Let us take into consideration the latest lingering domestic political tension, which is raising doubts about the Slovak Republic. This will certainly weigh heavily on the influx of foreign capital, and, without it, our economy will be incapable of competing more permanently on foreign markets. It is impossible to separate economic life and the activities of businessmen from the overall atmosphere in society. The unreasonable reaction to the demarches is being observed, first and foremost, by our potential foreign partners.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] What kind of role do the various politico-economic lobbies play in the country's overall economic policy? It is being said that there are certain connections with the HZDS.

[Kovac] Unfortunately, I have to state that yes, such tendencies are being displayed. There are, for example, the endeavors by HZDS supporters, who are obtaining certain advantages in the course of privatization—wherever the National Property Fund or the state bodies still have some influence. A certain servility and dependence on the political entities are being manifested there, and all of these circumstances may influence the decisionmaking of the business entities: Where they place their advertisements and how they will proceed in their investment plans. In this manner, the existence of the mass media can be influenced extremely well on the part of the HZDS.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Mr. President, what is new in the investigation into the kidnapping of your son? Do you believe there is an interest and effort on the part of the investigators and politicians to investigate this whole incident thoroughly?

[Kovac] I do not know what is new because no information is being given to the public, and the investigators are not interested in giving the president any information. I can say that it is taking too long and that there is a continuing attempt here to prolong the process. From the scant information I have, it is

becoming apparent that a great deal of time is being lost by investigating false leads and stories. This means a further delay because the specific leads discovered by the first and second investigators will not be pursued. No one has managed to cast doubt on them to this day. A lack of interest in revealing the real culprits is being manifested here, and this is understandably alarming. Every police failure alarms me; it alarms me if they do not manage to find the culprits who organize various means of intimidating people, businessmen, politicians, or journalists because this again arouses concern among the public about whether the state has sufficient power to safeguard and protect the health, certainties, and lives of citizens and so on.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] What kind of part may the Slovak Information Service [SIS] have played in the entire kidnapping incident?

[Kovac] This is a subject of the investigation. At the moment, there are only certain statements. For example, we recently had the opportunity to monitor in the daily SME the statement of one former SIS employee who described exactly what his role was. In this statement, and also in certain others that the investigators obviously obtained beforehand, there are many indications that some SIS staff, probably also police officers, and probably SIS equipment were involved in this kidnapping.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] What kind of power does the secret service director, Ivan Lexa, have exactly? He is spoken of as the state's eminence grise.

[Kovac] Secret service directors have relatively major powers because the supervision of their activity necessarily has to be more limited than the supervision of the activity of any other state body. Nevertheless, they can, of course, also use the equipment that the intelligence services use and also make use of the relatively large amount of money that is essential for intelligence activity, not to protect the constitutional interests of the appropriate country, but for narrow party political or even, I would say, personal or other interests. Therefore, two things are very important: that a person with a proven track record heads such a service, a person who is known to the public, for one thing, for his high level of morality, high principles, adherence to these principles, and objectivity and, for another, however much this person may be the *creme de la creme*, he also has to have effective control over himself. And, in our case, I think it is hard to say that Mr. Lexa would be known for the kind of attributes that are expected of the SIS director, and we also know that we cannot be satisfied with the way parliament exercises this supervision. After all, the parliamentary chairman and Mr. Lexa are

intimate friends. I do not even know to what extent the prime minister or the government can control the activity of the SIS director and other functionaries. Formally, they can, but it is hard to tell whether they indeed have enough time or the will for this.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] When we spoke with some of the Slovak journalists who are looking into this affair, we found out about their concerns for their safety and health. Do you think their concerns are justified?

[Kovac] Certain concerns are justified because we are finding out just how hard it is to uncover the perpetrators of such crimes. In this respect, they should not undertake any steps, make any statements, or do anything that could be described as exerting inadmissible political influence and as interference in the specific investigation process. If the public stops believing that, shall we say, the investigators or the police corps or the prosecutor's office are indeed steadfast and independent and that they do not let themselves be controlled by someone who has no right to interfere in this matter, that is, if such confidence is broken, then it goes without saying that scope will be created for fear to spread among the people.

I myself meet people who are indeed concerned either for their own health or that their children will be threatened, but I do not think this is somehow widespread. There is, nevertheless, a danger that, if the ability and readiness to uncover such crimes more energetically is not manifested, we will not prevent the spread of such concerns. Some of the prime minister's interferences in the course of the investigation into the kidnapping of M. Kovac Jr. have really not strengthened the citizens' confidence that these were interferences that should have led to the speedy and unequivocal following up of the leads that seemed indisputable at the beginning.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Do you think the intelligence service or perhaps the prime minister directly were somehow involved in this kidnapping? Do you think their remaining in their posts is acceptable?

[Kovac] This consideration is not my affair; I think it is too premature to judge it. However, I do know one thing: If this had happened in an advanced democratic country and there were at least the indications that our investigators have uncovered, the director of the secret service most probably would have been dismissed.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Another issue that is being perceived somewhat more controversially is the approved language law. What is your opinion on it?

[Kovac] I would not like to express a more detailed opinion on this law at the moment. From the beginning, I have been in favor of there being a good law on the

state language here. What we had until now was not appropriate. I have always declared that I will support any law that does not detract from the possibilities of the minorities for using their mother tongue or, alternatively, is not at variance with our Constitution and, as the case may be, with the international conventions we have adopted. At the moment, I am studying the adopted version.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Mr. President, how do you see the future for democracy in Slovakia?

[Kovac] Auspiciously, not only because I want it to be auspicious but also because I am convinced that the majority of our citizens are well aware that prosperity cannot be guaranteed without democracy and that any other path toward prosperity is very risky and, I would say, almost impossible. The fact that prosperity, stability, safeguarding our citizens' certainties, and protection for basic human rights can also be underwritten by our country's incorporation into the European Union is also associated with this because this is also a way for us to overcome more quickly certain economic problems and to make use of the major advantages that arise for the appropriate countries from membership in the European Union. So, this gives me the certainty that the majority of our citizens will stand up for the defense of democracy and democratic values.

Belgium 'Only EU Member' To Oppose Demarche
AU0412175095 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
1 Dec 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Jan Skoda: "Belgian Minister E. Derycke: Act United Abroad"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Erik Derycke yesterday concluded his 24-hour visit to Slovakia, in the course of which he held a three-hour talk with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar Wednesday night. At a news conference yesterday, the Belgian guest called on Slovak political parties to act united abroad.

According to information we obtained from high-level government circles, the Kingdom of Belgium was the only EU member country that disagreed with dispatching a demarche to the Slovak Government of Vladimir Meciar. This position of the Belgian side manifested itself also in the course of Derycke's visit to Slovakia, during which he also held talks with his Slovak counterpart, Juraj Schenk, with Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], and with members of the NRSR Foreign Affairs and Defense and Security Affairs Committees. According to Schenk, the views of the Slovak Republic and the

Kingdom of Belgium are very close on many issues. [passage omitted]

HZDS Lauds Meciar's French Visit, Language Law
LD0412211095 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 4 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The political executive of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] met at its regular session in Bratislava today.

It praised the results of the visit of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar to France, where he had talks with the highest representatives of the OECD on the prospects of future membership of Slovakia in the organization.

The political executive of the HZDS went on note that it could not assess the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic on the lack of legitimacy of the parliamentary investigation commissions as impartial. Moreover, it did not change the situation in parliament because the Constitution made it possible for the National Council to create committees on whose grounds commissions could work if needed.

It praised the fact that President Michal Kovac signed the Law on the State Language. It cannot, however, accept the conditions that it lays down in connection with minorities because they are contained, for example, also in the framework agreement on the protection of minorities.

Helsinki Federation Notes Human Rights Violations
AU0512082895 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 30 Nov 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Juraj Alner: "Representatives of International Helsinki Federation Criticize Lack of Pluralistic Awareness in Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Representatives of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF)—Executive Director Aaron Rhodes and Brigitte Dafour—visited Bratislava yesterday. The reason for their visit is their work on the project "Strengthening the Law in the Sphere of Human Rights Violations," which also comprises the Czech Republic and Hungary. Their first stop in Bratislava was our editorial office.

The IHF's task is to monitor the observance of the provisions of the Helsinki Conference Final Act and the follow-up documents on human rights. The project provides for the cooperation of lawyers in the solution of ascertained problems. The IHF is represented by 28 observer groups in Europe and North America.

On the basis of information from many nongovernmental and also international institutions (Council of Europe, EU, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and others), the IHF believes that Slovakia violates several international agreements. The IHF representatives consider violations of the freedom of speech to be the most important among them.

They spoke about attacks on journalists motivated by things they wrote and about dismissals of journalists on the basis of their work (suspension of the moderator of Banska Bystrica studio of Slovak Radio after his interview with Jan Budaj, dismissal of Slovak Radio's Washington correspondent, and so forth).

The government exercises excessive control over electronic media. They quoted a statement made by the Slovak Television director about the preferment of national interests. The objective of free media is to mediate discussion on developments within the state, in which each side has the right to express its opinion. The strength of a society dwells in the diversity of its views. The IHF registers that, in the main evening news programs of the electronic media, opposition views receive too little space. Most viewers and listeners of these programs have a limited opportunity to hear the other side.

Freedom of speech cannot be limited only through direct bans. There exist also other methods, such as economic restrictions.

Mrs. Dafour pointed out that a law exists in Slovakia, on the basis of which it is inadmissible to attack the president with impunity.

In connection with the murder of a Romany in Ziar nad Hronom, Aaron Rhodes wrote a letter to Prime Minister Meciar. The prime minister's reply "was encouraging. It was evident that he is taking this matter seriously." The government should also take other than police measures, which would prevent possible future attacks on members of minorities.

The IHF representatives mentioned the right of members of minorities to use their own language on the territory where they live in concentration. Slovakia has made great progress in the sphere of minority education, but it is expected that the government will show its determination to improve the present situation.

The basic issue is whether the government regards Slovakia as a national state or a pluralistic country of diverse ethnic groups with a Slovak majority.

The IHF draws attention to the way in which government power investigated signatures on the petition sheets of the Democratic Union [DU]: "Such disturbance [vyrusovanie] of citizens, ordered by law-

enforcement bodies, violates plurality because it discourages citizens from supporting an opposition party. The signatures were investigated in defiance of the Constitutional Court's ruling about the DU's legally valid participation in the elections."

According to the IHF representatives, it is not appropriate to ask whether the situation in Slovakia is better or worse than in other countries: Regardless of what anyone else might do, Slovakia must strive to observe all the norms that it has pledged to observe.

The IHF representatives are interested in meeting representatives of the appropriate ministries and in improving dialogue with the state. Their aim is not to condemn Slovakia but to find ways for Slovakia to move closer to the standards of advanced countries.

Report on Plans To Create Pro-HZDS Unions

AU0112132895 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
29 Nov 95 pp 1-2

[Article by "(cr)": "Yellow Unions in Slovakia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—There have been mounting reports recently that, in some privatized enterprises, the employer is pressing for the establishment in his enterprise of new unions independent of the Confederation of Trades Unions [KOZ].

The document "Main Tasks of the HZDS" [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia], drafted in September and submitted to the Republican Council by HZDS Deputy Chairman Arpad Matejka, is also devoted to the trade union issue. It says in the document that the trade unions want to take the government and citizens hostage and delay the solution of matter-of-fact problems by means of various obstructions. A way out, according to the document, "is to found new unions from among the employees of those enterprises, organizations, and institutions that, to a great extent, are now transformed and managed by their owners—by managements that are committed unequivocally to the programmatic orientation of the HZDS, are its supporters, and base their business activities on the democratic nature of the state." According to the document, "the new Unions of Slovakia would maintain the horizontal structure of the current unions, including the unions that have been established on the basis of the membership's occupation from among the ranks of the employees, members, and supporters of the HZDS."

According to the timetable, the proposal for new articles should be drawn up and a preparatory committee established to promote the founding Assembly of Trade Unions of Slovakia (that is, its supreme body—editor's note) by 30 November of this year, and its charter

and registration, because this will be a special-interest grouping of Slovak citizens with legal subjectivity, should be ready by 31 March 1996.

Such unions are called yellow unions in the world. According to KOZ Vice President Marian Lacko, it is possible for several trade union organizations to operate. In collective bargaining, however, they have to proceed with a single point of view. If they cannot reach an agreement, the strongest trade union organization conducts the bargaining. The KOZ representatives see this situation as a sign that they are inconvenient to the government in some issues. The KOZ Assembly sent an appeal to the government yesterday in which it asks it to submit speedily to the National Council of the Slovak Republic a draft amendment to the law that regulates certain relations between trade union organizations and employers and a draft amendment to the law on collective bargaining.

Union Leader on Possible Unions

AU0212165995 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
30 Nov 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Vaclav Stevko, vice president of the Confederation of Trade Unions of the Slovak Republic, by Livia Cernicka; place and date not given: "The Stronger Should Negotiate"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Cernicka] A Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] document has appeared among the public, discussing the establishment of new trade unions. Have any signals reached you from primary trade union organizations that pressure exists for the establishment of new trade unions?

[Stevko] I do not know how authentic this document is, and I am therefore unable to assess to what extent it is credible. It could, of course, also be a provocation. As for signals from primary organizations, yes, we do have signals that certain representatives are walking among our primary organizations and speaking about new trade unions.

[Cernicka] If a new trade union federation really came into being, who would have the right to conclude the General Agreement and to negotiate with social partners?

[Stevko] There already exist other trade union federations in Slovakia, but their membership is small, compared with that of the Confederation of Trade Unions [KOZ]. We have established cooperation and concluded agreements with them, so we negotiate also in their names. In the case you are referring to, the mechanism of representativeness should apply. He who has the most

members should have the moral right to negotiate and conclude agreements. Of course, we do not rule out the possibility of the partner, be it an employer or the government, giving preference even to a smaller group. However, that would not testify to a good situation, and we would be forced to send a signal abroad about this.

HZDS Paper Outlines HZDS's 'Main Tasks'

AU0512082595 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
30 Nov 95 p 2

[Article by "PA": "From the Proposed 'Main Tasks' of the Strongest Movement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The document that is the subject of the interview with Gustav Krajci, secretary of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], also contains other parts. One of them concerns "HZDS Policy in the Government and in State Administration Bodies," in which it is written, among other things:

In the present period, we are bearing witness to people sitting and making decisions in state administration organizations, who engage in policy that is directed against the government. This situation is unbearable, and it is necessary to take action. Likewise, new agencies are being established, such as the new central body of state administration for the strategy and development of society. This raises demands for new people, whom we do not have. On the basis of this situation, I propose the following solution:

—Continuing to solve the personnel issue in state administration organizations. Deadline: 31 October 1995. Responsible: government ministers.

—Preparing personnel changes in the sphere of foreign policy. Deadline: 31 October 1995. Responsible: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic.

—Preparing personnel changes in trade missions abroad. Deadline: 31 October 1995. Responsible: Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic.

—Renewing and replenishing the data bank of experts and the preparation of selected experts for the state administration (for example, by means of short-term work-and-study programs). Deadline: Permanent task. Responsible: Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic.

The document "Main Tasks of the HZDS" contains five parts. In addition to those mentioned previously, they concern "HZDS Policy in District Bodies," "Strengthening the HZDS's Position in Society," and "HZDS Policy Toward Nonstate Organizations and Foundations."

Ministry Official Praises Integration With NATO

*LD0512105695 Budapest MTV Television Network
in Hungarian 0600 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungary's cooperation with the NATO forces in the peace enforcement in Bosnia is an important step toward integration, Ferenc Somogyi, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at a meeting marking the fifth anniversary of the founding of the Hungarian Military Studies Society.

[Unidentified correspondent] Ferenc Somogyi said that in the course of transformation, the Hungarian army's way of thinking and technical development should be accommodated to NATO requirements. He said NATO may have a beneficial effect on economic development since its presence gives the message to foreign investors that it is worth investing in this country.

Istvan Fodor, state secretary at the Ministry of Defense, called attention to the fact that the military's chronic shortage of funds may hinder the desired transformation. The government has been spending less and less on defense: in 1988, 3.5 percent of the GDP, this year only 1.48 percent. The army is at the technical level of the sixties. Istvan Fodor considers it important therefore that a comprehensive army development program be drawn up as soon as possible.

Rails To Transport Troops 'Despite' 1 Jan Strike

*LD0512163695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1600 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite a rail strike planned for 1 January 1996, railway workers guarantee the transport of NATO and UN troops passing through Hungary. The transport in question is about 10 to 12 trains per day. The Free Trade Union of Railway Workers and the Engine Drivers' Trade Union have started talks with the Hungarian State Railway managers on the conditions and extent of the required minimum of services during the strike.

National Assembly Supports Bosnian Participation

*LD0512165395 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1600 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee supports Hungary's participation in the international forces assisting the settlement of the crisis in former Yugoslavia with a technical unit. [passage omitted]

Commentary Assesses Slovak Foreign Policy

*AU2811190595 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 25 Nov 95 p 4*

[Commentary by "security policy expert" Laszlo Tolnay: "Slovakia Between East and West—In Which Direction Is the Cart Heading?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The events in Slovakia today make one ponder. It is hard to discover in which direction its leaders want to push the country's cart. On its election, the third Meciar cabinet promised to continue the previous foreign policy line. Moreover, given the well-known anti-Western and anti-Hungarian bias of its coalition partners, this line also appears in the coalition agreement. As the main goal, they set out to join the European Union and NATO, including the goal of becoming a full EU member by the year 2000. It seems, however, that these efforts only appear on the level of rhetoric. Actually, Bratislava does nothing to improve Slovakia's international evaluation. Nowadays, Slovakia is not engaged in creating "euro-conformity"; on the contrary, one can see an increase in the opposite trend.

The West is following the duality in Slovak foreign policy with confused concern. While, in his recent speech in London, Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk kept insisting that joining NATO is the first priority of Slovak foreign policy and that Bratislava continues to regard NATO as the major security institution, Slovakia displays stubborn opposition in the areas where progress would be of utmost importance for reaching the main goal (except for the Slovak activity in the Partnership for Peace Program). Slovakia's western neighbors follow the domestic developments with disbelief, namely the serious shortcomings in the area of democratic constitutionalism as well as the way the Slovak Government and the parties that form this government react to the well-meaning remarks. The power struggle between Meciar and President Kovac only adds to all this. The claim of the Slovak political leadership that the criticized phenomena are not real but are based on false information finds increasingly less understanding.

This probably also contributed to the increasing reservations toward Bratislava's political attitude. Rumor has it that responsible officials of Western powers and institutions repeatedly told the Slovak Government that, although they do not want to openly criticize them in connection with the aforementioned phenomena, this does not mean that they regard Slovakia's domestic development as satisfactory in every respect. These officials acknowledge and welcome the fact that Slovakia is advancing in the right direction in some areas of cooperation with the West, like in the framework of the Part-

nership for Peace Program, but they continue to firmly expect developments in the process of advancing the democratic political system and the market economy.

They stressed that Western institutions continue to be interested in the emergence of a democratic legal state and a functioning market economy in Slovakia, so Slovakia can also "join the ranks" of EU and NATO. However, this makes it inevitable for Bratislava to accept the Western system of values and refrain from giving the impression that they are not interested in reaching the goals they have set for themselves.

The aforementioned officials also find the duality confusing, namely that, while the government is trying to convince its partners of the firmness of its intention to join the European integration, the coalition parties that form the government represent the opposite stance. This, too, raises serious doubts regarding the sincerity of Slovakia's intentions.

It is difficult to harmonize between the intention to join the European integration as expressed in the latest speech of the Slovak foreign minister in parliament and the rude rejection coming from the leading figures of the coalition parties, like that from Jan Slota, the leading politician of the Slovak National Party, namely that, from the very beginning, his party has regarded the acceptance of the risks and burdens inherent in joining NATO as unjustified. In addition, the aforementioned politician regards the fact that Slovakia's geopolitical situation would deteriorate considerably with NATO membership as dangerous. Moreover, in his interview for the Russian press agency, Jan Slota also said that Slovakia would act more wisely if it stayed out of the NATO and displayed a neutral attitude, because NATO's expansion toward the East will justifiably elicit Russia's dissatisfaction.

The Association of Workers of Slovakia uses a similar tone. Jan Luptak, the party's chairman, declared that the party members oppose Slovakia's EU and NATO membership because the former is "one of the spiritual centers of workers' exploitation" and the latter "would make the Slovak citizens carry useless burdens."

Although, after its meeting on 3 October 1995, the Slovak Government issued a statement in which it confirmed its intention to become a full member of the euro-atlantic institutions and is strengthening its relations with its future partners for this, it could not dissipate the suspicions. Bratislava's "special" relations with Russia added to this suspicion.

From the very beginning, Moscow attributed special attention to Slovakia. Soon after the creation of the Slovak state, Boris Yeltsin visited Bratislava in August

1993 and, actually, they developed a system of bilateral relations that they confirmed later in the Basic Treaty. An analysis of the bilateral agreements reveals that Slovakia took upon itself to consider the Russian interests in developing its international relations and to strive for intensive political dialogue on various levels with Moscow.

Regarding this, we should also mention that, because of a lack of energy and raw materials, strategic interests link Slovakia to Russia, and they are clearly trying to make use of this. This is why Bratislava attributed special importance to Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's recent visit, in the course of which, according to official statements, they mainly discussed economic issues.

It is still difficult to see the extent to which Slovakia's economic problems are connected with the initiative aimed at expanding CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Agreement] and the desire to include the Baltic states and the Balkans.

The other problem is Slovakia's policy toward its neighbors, namely, its policy toward the national minorities, a policy that has become even more "confrontational" than before. The reason for this, however, is to be found mostly in domestic policy factors, rather than in foreign policy factors. In addition to the aforementioned coalition parties that believe in extremist nationalist principles, the right wing of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, the prime minister's party, also contributed to this. Holding the key ministries (defense, education and culture), this group not only questions the government's foreign policy orientations, but also displays an extremist position regarding the national minorities living in Slovakia, including the ethnic Hungarians.

Apparently, Vladimir Meciar does not share these views, but it is a fact that, if his interest demands it, he plays the "Hungarian card" without hesitation. His scope is rather limited in these matters too, because, in his personal war with the president, he cannot risk the break up of the coalition. It seems that, with the signing of the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty, Meciar regards its function as fulfilled, namely to improve the image.

Evaluating all this, the following question seems to be justified: In what direction is Slovakia advancing today?

Police Official Interviewed on Organized Crime
AU2911164095 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 27 Nov 95 pp 1, 8

[Interview with Colonel Laszlo Tonhauser, head of a main department of the National Police Headquarters,

by Attila Gy. Fekete; place and date not given: "Organized Crime Wants To Infiltrate Into Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Fekete] The police tried to combat the organizing underworld twice at the end of the 1970's. A special unit was set up at the time, but it was not successful....

[Tonhauser] That is not true. From a police standpoint, the series of actions carried out at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's was successful. We succeeded in discovering the existence of several well-organized groups of criminals. If we had continued the action, Hungary would have received proven facts about the existence of organized crime in this country. However, at that time, we could not do this for political reasons and both investigations were closed. It was still forbidden to speak of organized crime here at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's. However, the investigation at that time showed the emerging hierarchy within the criminal groups and that certain groups were specializing in large-scale larceny, robbery, and car theft. At the beginning, the members and leaders of these gangs only regarded as important to make enough to cover their luxurious life styles. Later, they invested the money in boutiques and tobacco shops. Before the change in the regime, in the course of preliminary privatization, some individuals whom the police came to know as robbers emerged as entrepreneurs and investors. Others invested the criminals' money in various ventures. The underworld needed people who spoke languages, were

versed in financial and legal matters, and were moving in the highest circles thanks to their high education. When privatization began in the wake of the change in the regime, these groups appeared as well-known entrepreneurs and investors and, if necessary, they had enough money for corruption to achieve their goals. Today, they are already in the legal profession. It only takes one step for them to also infiltrate the decisionmakers' circle. [passage omitted]

[Fekete] How great is the influence of organized crime in Hungary? Are there several foreign criminal groups operating in Hungary?

[Tonhauser] We are not aware of any foreign group that is not being assisted by Hungarians. The foreigners need someone who knows the language and the legal conditions and who sets up a venture for them. The influence of criminal groups of foreigners primarily depends on the size of their capital. At a recent conference, the FBI director spoke of how Russian organized crime had surprised the United States. They have so much money that they can buy anything. According to one survey, the annual income of U.S. and European organized crime from drugs sales alone must be around \$80-100 billion. So much money can only be moved with the help of bank and bankers or insurance experts. The fees for money laundering must be around \$8-10 billion. This amount of money carries considerable weight in the competition among the banks. [passage omitted]

Bosnian Serb Sources: Karadzic To Be Sacked 'Soon'

AU0512150095 Paris AFP in English
1451 GMT 5 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec 5 (AFP) — Radovan Karadzic will soon be sacked as the Bosnian Serbs' political leader under pressure from Serbia, the independent news agency BETA reported Tuesday [5 December].

Quoting Bosnian Serb sources, it said Karadzic, who has been indicted for war crimes by an international tribunal, would be replaced right before or right after the signing ceremony for the Bosnian peace accord December 14 in Paris.

"Belgrade is growing anxious and will not accept him being eased out gradually or a promise that he will leave," the agency quoted one Bosnian Serb source as saying.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has put a close Karadzic aide, Nikola Koljevic, in charge of securing Karadzic's departure, BETA said.

Milosevic is widely seen as having been Karadzic's main patron in the early stages of the Bosnian war but fell out with him as Karadzic rejected various peace plans, preventing the lifting of international sanctions that were strangling the Serbian economy.

BETA added that in his bid to force out Karadzic, Milosevic already had the support of many Bosnian Serb officials in the Serb-held town of Banja Luka in northern Bosnia.

The peace accord reached in Dayton last month bars anyone indicted for war crimes, such as Karadzic and Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladic, from holding a political or military position in post-war Bosnia.

The accord divides Bosnia into a Serb entity and a Moslem-Croat federation. The Serbian government wants to get rid of Karadzic as Serb leader because of the war crimes indictment handed down by the international tribunal in the Hague, BETA said.

However analysts believe Milosevic may have seen himself threatened by Karadzic, who in the later stages of the Bosnian conflict presented himself as a serious rival to the Serbian president for the leadership of former Yugoslavia's Serb people. The Dayton accord was widely seen as representing the end of Karadzic's career as a Serb leader.

Sacirbegovic Allays Fears of 'Cypriotization'

AU0412195395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic has given an interview to the B-H PRESS news agency, in which he says that all the diplomatic representatives of the world powers who have been thronging to the Bosnia-Herzegovina capital recently have received a clear message from the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina that the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the stabilization of the situation in the region depend greatly on their consistency in implementing the peace agreement.

For this evening's newscast, we have selected a part of the interview in which Sacirbegovic is asked about the fear felt by Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens that the IFOR [Implementation Force] deployment along the separation line will lead to the cypriotization of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Can our diplomatic corps do more to see to it that these forces are also deployed along the border between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia?

It is clear that the separation line [linija razgranice] is something quite different from the demarcation line [demarkaciona linija] between the two entities and that our goal is to have that line reintegrated. However, we are at the moment mostly concerned with finding real possibilities for that reintegration. I have always believed, and I still do, that the concept of our state as an open, democratic, and multicultural society is much stronger in peacetime than the one opposing us in the Serb Republic, a fascistic, intolerant, and closed society. Our state has to flourish through the economy, economic aid, and its involvement in international integrational trends. The state bodies must fully function with all their capacities. That is where my greatest worry lies. I think that in Dayton at times we might have been more concerned with the number of functions that the central bodies of authority were to have and less with the quality of these functions. At times we might have been asking for too much without first securing the functioning of the most important aspects: foreign affairs and the central bank.

I am not worried about IFOR leading to the cypriotization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. My main concern is whether we will really have the things that should be our driving force toward reintegration and other progressive trends: strong central functions and their consistent functioning, Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic said.

UN Envoy Annan Supports French UN General

*AU0312212395 Paris AFP in English
1844 GMT 3 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 3 (AFP) — UN envoy Kofi Annan on Sunday [3 December] expressed support for controversial French General Jean Rene Bachelet, commander of UNPROFOR troops in Sarajevo, who has said that the Bosnia peace accords will force the Serbs in the Bosnian capital to flee.

"I have full confidence in General Bachelet and hope that this incident will now be regarded as closed," said Annan in a written statement.

"It would be particularly unfortunate if this incident were to detract from General Bachelet's well-earned reputation for his unstinting work towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Bosnia," said Annan, the United Nations' special envoy to the former Yugoslavia.

"We would like to make clear that General Bachelet was not, in making these remarks, reflecting the view of the UN."

The French Defence Ministry had already distanced itself from its general's views, saying Friday that they did not reflect the government's support for the peace accords, initialled by the leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia last month, and its determination for "a united, multicultural and democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina."

The Bosnian Serb leadership has protested bitterly at provisions in the peace agreement that Serb-held suburbs of Sarajevo be transferred to Bosnian government control, and threatened either to evacuate the areas in a scorched earth policy, or to defend the areas by military force.

Report Views Deployment of NATO Troops, IFOR

*AU0512091495 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 30 Nov 95 p 10*

[Report by Bruno Lopandic: "IFOR Also on the Drina River"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The formal and necessary procedure of accepting the NATO plan for deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina has started. The draft plan was accepted by the NATO members on Tuesday [28 November] and two formalities are to follow: the Security Council resolution on the plan and the final approval of the plan by the NATO Council in Brussels. The arrival of the NATO units, it is expected, should occur a day or two after the signing ceremony in Paris.

However, what will this agenda look like in the end?

It is already reliably known that the already existing Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] and the UN troops in Bosnia will be used for the future NATO operation. It should not be forgotten that RRF consist of just under 10,000 troops. According to what is known about the plan for NATO deployment on the ground so far, there will be three basic sectors. The U.S. sector will be in the northeast, with its headquarters in Tuzla. Apart from the Americans, there will be also 2,000 Russian troops in the area. Since the Russian Federation has agreed to U.S. command, a compromise formula has been devised, with General Leonid Sevcov giving the orders to the Russian troops. In addition to the U.S. and Russian units in that area, there will also be a Nordic brigade, drawn from the existing UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] contingent.

The British sector will be situated in the northwest with its headquarters in Gornji Vakuf. There will be 12,000 troops, who will also be accompanied by Canadian and Turkish troops. The center of the French zone will be in Mostar, and will also include Sarajevo. The talk is of 10,000 French and 1,500 Spaniards from the UNPROFOR contingent, plus some 2,000 Italians. Within the framework of IFOR [Implementation Force], which is the official name of the international forces in this NATO operation, there will also be 5,000 German rear-echelon workers.

The official answer to what the real task of IFOR is, is the implementation and control of the provisions of the Dayton agreement. What will be requested from the warring sides within that? All sides must establish a demarcation zone along the lines of the cease-fire and withdraw their units to 2 km from it. Within the 30 days that NATO estimates will be necessary for the arrival of sufficient IFOR forces, its units on the ground will be strong and equipped enough to assist in the implementation of these objectives. Since the NATO operation, once approved by a Security Council resolution, will be under an exceptionally firm mandate, far more robust than the UNPROFOR mandate, NATO heads consider that the tasks, at least in the military field, will be solved efficiently and quickly.

In the political sense, to show that they care about the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a certain number of NATO units will be deployed on the international border on the Drina River and the monitoring system along the demarcation line will essentially differ from that used by UNPROFOR. The bulk of the forces will be deployed in the larger towns and villages and the patrols will be operating along the demarcation line.

The next problem, mentioned by many officials, regards "timing." The complete deployment of all the units will

take at least three months, which means that a good part of the mandate will already have expired. Namely, nobody is ruling out the possibility that after a year it will be necessary to prolong it. In that case, the interested sides should be talked into it, as well as the U.S. Congress and the American public. Regardless of these predictions, everybody agrees that the U.S. plan, now that they have already succeeded in talking the three presidents into Dayton, depends upon the first six months on the ground.

Government 'Offended' by Agnelli's Serb Talks

*BR0512102295 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian
5 Dec 95 p 6*

[Report by Vanna Vannuccini on telephone interview with Bosnian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mirsa Haivic in Sarajevo; date not given: "Agnelli Offended Us: Bosnian Government Disappointed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Mrs. Agnelli insulted our government's sovereignty by meeting with Karadzic's envoys on Bosnian territory without notifying us of the meeting." The Bosnian presidency is more disappointed than angry. There seems to be no explanation for this diplomatic discourtesy. "We always invite foreign diplomats to talk with the Serbs of Pale, unless they are people accused of war crimes. It is important that they use their powers of persuasion on behalf of the Dayton peace agreements, and that they act as spokesmen for the guarantees of safety and freedom that the Bosnian Government intends to give the Serbian population," we were told over the telephone by Mirsa Haivic, spokesman for Foreign Minister Sacirbegovic. "But nobody told us that the Italian minister arranged a meeting with a Pale delegation. We were astonished when an evidently well-informed journalist put the question to Mrs. Agnelli, and the minister replied with embarrassment that she would be meeting with the representatives of Pale a few minutes later."

The talks were cut off at that point, Haivic added, and all that the astonished representatives of the Bosnian Government could do was to remonstrate with Susanna Agnelli while accompanying her to the armored vehicle that was waiting for her. "Such conduct really cannot be said to be correct in terms of protocol," Sacirbegovic objected. Agnelli replied frankly that the meeting was scheduled to go ahead, but that in future she would respect the Bosnian Government's sovereignty.

It is difficult to know what prompted our foreign minister and her delegation to commit this breach of protocol, which certainly could not have gone unnoticed (everything in Sarajevo takes place under UN escort, and information is inevitably leaked.) Paradoxically, the

aim of the visit was to make relations with the Bosnian Government more cordial, after the Italian Foreign Ministry's insistence on the concept of "neutrality" clouded them during the war. Of course, it is necessary to maintain a dialogue with the Bosnian Serbs at a time when Italian troops are about to be deployed in the region, but the secrecy of the initiative seemed inexplicable to the Bosnians. The Sarajevo newspapers even revived the charge that Susanna Agnelli has "family business in Serbia" — a charge that has often been leveled in the past in order to explain the Italian Foreign Ministry's pro-Serbian policy. There was of course no comment from the Italian Embassy [as published] in Sarajevo, but it seems that the meeting was organized by Rome and Belgrade without notifying the Italian mission in the Bosnian capital.

Speaking in Brussels yesterday, Minister Agnelli reaffirmed that those guilty of war crimes in Bosnia must be arrested and handed over to the court in The Hague. Alexa Buha, the man with whom Mrs. Agnelli spoke at Sarajevo airport, is not among these. Nevertheless, Mirsa Haivic pointed out, the man who still considers himself Pale's "foreign minister" is certainly not among those trying to help the peace process. As Cardinal Puljic told LA REPUBBLICA during a visit to Rome, "Buha is an envoy for two persons, Karadzic and Mladic, who are not authorized to represent the Serbian people and who must explain to their people why they had so many people killed."

In Brussels Susanna Agnelli said that "the Serbs are worried about an exaggeration" of the number of people that could be charged as criminals. "There are vast amounts of evidence against the very people who are obstructing the implementation of the agreements," Haivic pointed out from Sarajevo.

Delic Addresses Brigade on Need for Readiness

*AU0412163195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[Report by Mladen Bosnjak on statement by Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army General Staff, at an oath-taking ceremony of new recruits to the Guards Brigade in Sarajevo on 4 December — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Guards unit is neither Glorious nor Chivalrous [unit designations in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army]. It is the one and only. In its combat experience so far and the courage of its fighters, it is elite and will remain that way. This was stressed by Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army General Staff, in a brief address to

veterans and new recruits to this unit. [passage omitted]
Congratulating the new soldiers, Mr. Delic said:

[Begin recording] We have been taught over the last three and a half years that plans come and go. Many have come and gone, as they have not been backed by the firm determination of the international community. Not only these plans, but also this country and people would probably have disappeared by now, had it not been for another kind of determination, that to defend this country and this nation, the determination of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

You must know that the better you are able to use your weapons and carry out your duties, the more successful you will be if the need arises — though I hope that it does not — to resume the defense and the possible further liberation of our country. You are probably the first generation of soldiers, after three and a half years of war, to have to use the experience from this war to learn and perfect your skills with your older colleagues so that never again will this country be caught unprepared to defend itself from any aggression, either from outside or from within. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Krajisnik Explains Opposition to Dayton Deal

AU0512093495 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
1 Dec 95 pp 12-13

[Interview with Momcilo Krajisnik, "chairman of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic," by Jovan Janjic; place and date not given: "Momo Is Defending Sarajevo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Statements by Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic, regarding the Dayton treaty have disturbed the triumphant mood boosted by the state media in Serbia about "the coming of peace."

[Janjic] Mr. Chairman, do you stick to the statement you issued after the completion of the talks in Dayton that this plan, such as it is, cannot be accepted?

[Krajisnik] I stick to my statement. I am against the treaty, particularly because I consider that a large part of Serbian territory has gone to the Muslim-Croat federation, and because I think that the entire Serbian territory was far more compact before Dayton. This agreement has reduced the structure and compactness of the territory. When I say this, I want to add that I oppose the way in which all this has been done. The Dayton agreement has brought about peace, but I cannot agree with the results we have reached.

[Janjic] Is it true that you did not accept the agreement, either in Dayton or in Belgrade?

[Krajisnik] In Dayton, our delegation did not sign the treaty. The explanation was stated publicly, which is that we were not satisfied with the details that I have just mentioned. As for Belgrade, our state leadership and delegation talked with [Serbian] President Milosevic, [FRY] President Lilic, [Montenegrin] President Bulatovic, and other officials of the state leaderships of Montenegro, Serbia, and Yugoslavia. We clarified some things and adopted certain guidelines. In fact, we tried to improve the current situation. The entire leadership agreed that the Dayton treaty should be initialed. I did not initial it, but President Karadzic, being the authorized representative, did. The fact that he initialed it does not mean that we, the rest of the leadership, did not agree.

[Janjic] Do you believe that some things in this agreement can be changed?

[Krajisnik] All the mediators and negotiators who took part in the talks are warning us that nothing can be changed in the agreement, which is logical, because they do not want to call it into question. However, it is unavoidable that solutions for certain things have to be found. If they are not found, particularly for regions that the Serbs are supposed to leave, and primarily for Sarajevo — that is to say, the regions given up to the Muslim-Croat federation — we shall simply not be able to implement the agreement. When I say this, I want to point out that there are some big, objective problems that must be resolved. Take Sarajevo, for instance, where more than 120,000 Serbs live. Simply, the Serbs do not want to stay under Muslim authority, and they do not want to be unprotected. They want to stay there, to have their own authorities, and, after all, to get an appropriate political solution. They want to be provided for, accommodated, and to settle the question of their property. There are hundreds of problems about that location. No minor problem — all right, somewhat minor, but still a problem — is Vukosavlje [Odzak], where 16,000 to 20,000 people who have already been refugees three times are accommodated. That is a crime against those people, who are now supposed to leave the area again. We do not accept the solution, it being actually idealistic and completely unrealistic, saying that those people may stay, that they would be protected, and that there is no reason for them to leave. In reality, that is not feasible.

[Janjic] How do you comment on the allegations that you are so sensitive about the issue of Sarajevo because you own two houses there? Even Lord Owen refers to this in his book, saying that it is impossible to discuss the issue of Sarajevo with you.

[Krajsnik] Not only Lord Owen, but many other people have also called me the greatest defender of Sarajevo. Unable to deal with the problem with arguments, they are implying that I am defending Sarajevo because of my property there. However, I am just one out of 120,000 people. The belief that only Muslims live in Sarajevo is a matter of propaganda. The only obstacle to that propaganda, which ought to be eliminated, was me and several other people. What they allege has never been my stance. It is equally painful to give up some other territories, but Sarajevo is a particular problem because both economic power and people are concentrated there.

Now a terrible crime against the Serbs has been committed.

It is true that, of all the negotiators there, meaning both Muslim and Serb ones, I am the only one who was born in Sarajevo, and certainly nobody has a right to love Sarajevo more than I do. A great injustice has been done to us by the media propaganda, so that we have to relinquish Sarajevo to the Muslims and, in that respect, one cannot choose the means of accomplishing one's goal. I definitely reject such allegations against me. I want to share the destiny of the entire people — which I am doing even now — but the propaganda was so ruthless and adamant that even personal reasons were implied as a motive for some decisions. I was even offered five houses in Serbia and a larger piece of land as compensation, if only I would accept the plan. In fact, people see things from the basis of their own personal attitudes and think that personal reasons are also more important than state interests for other people.

[Janjic] Did you receive that offer from Serbia?

[Krajsnik] No, I did not. I was offered those houses in Serbia, but it was not Serbia's offer. That was more like a joke, and, in fact, the proposal was made in a rather nonchalant manner, like: You will get much more in Serbia....

Sarajevo is the second largest Serb city. We cannot disregard that, in the western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we lost many purely Serb territories. We are said to have obtained some regions that were not ours, but did Drvar not belong to the Serbs, were not Bosanski Petrovac, Bosanska Krupa, Glamoc, Grahovo.... all Serbian? Those are the nurseries of Serbianhood. And certainly, now that we are losing those regions, we are losing our roots and tradition.

And I would not regret it if the end result were a rounded off, compact entity. You have seen that the border used to encompass Bosanska Krupa, Sanski Most, Kljuc, and Bosanski Petrovac. We were supposed to cede 0.2 to 0.1

percent of our territory and get three or four cities in return. This was also unacceptable — instead of making it possible for 100,000 refugees to return to their homes, we would have produced 100,000 new refugees. People cannot understand that Sarajevo is the second largest Serb city in the former Yugoslavia, that Serbs have been living there for many centuries, and that they have defended it throughout the war. And the entire Serbian people should stand up to such an unjust solution. It was really hard for me to listen to our opponents and even some of our own people who were expressing support for the plan. Many Muslim positions, townships, or parts of their territory have become legendary to them, while none of our regions have been put on the same level. Simply, it is as if the Serbs who heroically defended Ilijas, Vogosca, Rajlovac, Ilidza, and Grbavica did not exist. Or, for instance, the Serbs who heroically defended Borke, Kopaca, or who fought in the Neretva River valley, and who were prevented from returning to Tasovcici, Prebilovci, or Mostar. All this is being put on a different level, not to mention the people at Vozuca or Mount Ozren, or Dobo, which was being shelled all the time.... Or, say, Brcko, which has remained to protect the most steadfast Serb connection hub. All this is being ignored, and the significance of the regions under Muslim control is being overvalued. Gorazde is at the focus of attention, while Gorazde, in fact, did not have a chance of falling, because it is an enclave. The people of Ilijas, Vogosca, and Ilidza could have left on many occasions, but they remained there. Now, those who are pointing out that such a solution is unjust are being blamed.

Bosnian Serb Assembly Forms Implementation HQ

LD2911212695 *Pale Sprska Televizija*
in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 29 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The 36th regular session of the Bosnian Serb Government was held in Vogosca this evening. It formed headquarters and working parties for the implementation of the peace agreement in the Bosnian Serb Republic.

Three kinds of headquarters and working parties were formed: a specialist group for interpreting the constitutional principles of the peace agreement; regional headquarters for Sarajevo, Vukosavlje, Herzegovina, Srbinje, and Olovo; and headquarters on the basis of the activities they will be responsible for.

Members of the government also approved a fall sowing plan.

After this session, the 13th extraordinary session of the government in its expanded form is supposed to begin. Members of the government will be joined by

the presidents of the war presidencies and the executive committee chairmen of Serb Sarajevo municipalities. They are to discuss Serb Sarajevo and the consequences of the Dayton agreement, in connection with the status of this city and its inhabitants.

Serb Council Suggests Initiatives for Sarajevo

AU2911212795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb Civic Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina has sent a letter to Richard Holbrooke, Carl Bildt, Kofi Annan, Antonio Pedauye, Hasan Muratovic [minister in the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and president of the State Committee for Cooperation With the United Nations], and Tarik Kuposovic [Sarajevo mayor] in which it has expressed the view that the Pale leadership is manipulating civilians as it is rejecting the peace solution for Sarajevo. The civilian population is being pushed into a new tragedy that could occur with the population moving out or the continuation of fighting, the letter of the Serb Civic Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina points out.

We take the view that the action of the international community and the EU on implementing peace and the peace solution for the city of Sarajevo are lagging behind. Despite the statements that they are offering safety to the civilians, the organs of the legal authorities and the media are slowly ridding themselves of war rhetoric in the interest of peace and reconciliation. A distinction must be made between the civilian population and the extremists and those who have committed crimes during the war.

At the initiative of the Serb Civic Council, a consultative meeting was held with the representatives of the international community and the legal organs of the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the city of Sarajevo. Everyone shares the view that the implementation of the peace solution for Sarajevo is the main condition for the implementation of the peace solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the political future of a multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We would like to acquaint you with two of our initiatives. The first is that the representatives of international institutions should immediately open their offices in Vogošća, Ilidža, Hadžici, Ilijaš, and Grbavica in order to assume the protection of civilians' rights. The second is that the international community should appoint a mediator in the talks on the implementation of the peace solution for Sarajevo. With the authority of the international community, the mediator would initiate talks between the representatives of the Sarajevo that is under

the control of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sarajevo under the control of the Pale regime to work out a statute for the city and set up joint institutions of the city, the letter of the Serb Civic Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina states.

Serbs in Serb-Held Sarajevo Refuse Dayton Maps

LD0412181395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1625 GMT 4 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 4 Nov (SRNA) — At today's session of the assembly of Serb Sarajevo in Grbavica its deputies adopted a declaration whereby they accept peace under the Dayton agreement, but not the map of demarcation between the entities according to which Serb Sarajevo belongs to the Muslim-Croat Federation. Following the session, lasting one hour and half, Sarajevo Mayor Vojislav Maksimovic read out the declaration, which reads as follows:

1. The Assembly of the Serb city of Sarajevo accepts peace and a peaceful solution to the conflict.
2. The Assembly does not accept the map of demarcation between the entities that grants the Muslim-Croat Federation Serb Sarajevo.
3. The Assembly, expressing the will of the people, does not accept Muslim-Croat authority in the area of Serb Sarajevo.
4. Prior to the signing of the peace agreement in Paris we demand of representatives of the Serb people to respect its will and ensure its right to remain in the Serb Republic and to make sure this is guaranteed in a separate written document within the Paris agreement.
5. The Assembly calls on people to stay in their homes and continue their political struggle until the final solution for their status.
6. The Assembly calls on the United States, the members of the Contact Group, and the international community to accept the legitimate interests of the Serb people in Serb Sarajevo."

In addition to adopting the declaration, the deputies to the City Assembly decided to organize a referendum on 12 December 1995, so the citizens can answer the question — "Do you favor the solution for Serb Sarajevo as envisaged under the Dayton agreement, yes or no?"

Serb Refugee Commission Wants UN Guarantees

LD0412233695 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2130 GMT 4 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 4 Dec (SRNA) — The UNHCR should use its mandate and authority to

make sure that citizens of Serb Sarajevo are offered better guarantees of safety and that their rights are respected in the long-term process of implementing the peace agreement, the Serb Republic Commission for Refugees believes.

A statement forwarded to SRNA, which was issued this evening by the commission and signed by Commissioner Ljubisa Vladusic, says:

"Should the citizens of Serb Sarajevo be dissatisfied with solutions on offer, and should they decide to use their right to determine where their future place of residence will be, which is in accordance with Geneva conventions and the international humanitarian law, the commission will request the UNHCR to draw up a program of their accommodation to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe."

UNHCR has been warned that in that case neither the relevant bodies of the Serb Republic nor the commission "will be able to secure any conditions for their survival" because of the huge number of Serb refugees from occupied parts of the Serb Republic.

This statement is a reply to Belgrade-based UNHCR spokesperson Christine Anderson, who has coldly said that the Sarajevo Serb population could move to other parts of the Serb Republic. [passage omitted]

Pale Police 'Turning Back' Fleeing Sarajevo Serbs

AU0312164495 Paris AFP in English
1629 GMT 3 Dec 95

[Report by Ljubomir Milasin]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Ilijas, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec 3 (AFP) — The Bosnian Serb authorities are turning back Sarajevo Serbs who are attempting to flee the city ahead of a transfer of Serb-controlled suburbs to government control, Serb and UN sources here said.

Rebel leaders in Pale have issued no official decision yet on how to react to a peace treaty stipulation that retains Sarajevo as a unitary city and places it under Bosnian Government control, placing its Serb inhabitants under the administration of their recent adversaries.

Radovan Karadzic, the rebel Serbs' political leader, and General Ratko Mladic, their military chief, have rejected the land transfer and demanded a renegotiation of the deal, threatening to pull out the Serb population or to defend the areas by military force.

However police in the Serb-held suburb of Ilijas, in the northwest of the city, have been turning back residents attempting to move from the sector with their belongings, according to several people questioned here by AFP.

A police official said the Pale authorities "decided on this half-way through last week" but declined to provide further details.

A UN peacekeeper at nearby Sarajevo airport reported Serb police "turning back any cars they saw loaded up with personal belongings."

He cited a convoy of "around 15 cars loaded with mattresses, blankets, cooking materials" which had attempted to enter the suburb of Lukavica which is due to remain under Serb control under the peace deal.

"The Serb authorities want to raise the stake in the event of any eventual horse-trading with the Bosnian Government," a young Serb soldier said in a personal analysis. "If we all leave now, there won't be anything left to trade away."

Ilijas is a stronghold of Serb nationalism where opposition to the Croat-Moslem federation runs deep, enhanced by the memory of 1,800 dead, according to local officials. [passage omitted]

Iran's Velayati Talks With Islamic Community

AU0112155195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 1 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] After the Friday service in the Beg's Mosque, Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati and his aides today visited the headquarters of the Islamic community in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In his talks with Reis ul-Ulema Mustafa Effendi Cerić and his deputy, Hadži Haset Ismet Effendi Spahić, he exchanged views on the Islamic faith in the world, especially the position of the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the prospects after the Dayton peace agreement.

The talks were also attended by Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Šaćirbegović and Omer Behman, ambassador of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Iran.

Reis ul-Ulema Mustafa Effendi Cerić thanked Minister Velayati for the support and aid extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina by the friendly people and government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Memorandum of Understanding Signed With Iran

LD0112171795 Tehran IRIB Television First Program
Network in Persian 1530 GMT 1 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Iran and Bosnia have signed a memorandum of understanding for cooperation at the

end of a two-day visit by the Iranian foreign minister to Bosnia.

Taking into account the Iranian experience in matters of reconstruction, there is an emphasis in the memorandum on Iran's participation in the reconstruction of Bosnia, the Central News Unit reported.

According to the memorandum, a joint commission is to be established to help the expansion of relations between the two countries.

The memorandum of understanding was signed by 'Ali Akbar Velayati and Muhamed Sacirbegovic, foreign ministers of Iran and Bosnia. [passage omitted]

Muslim Leader Worried Over New Croat Leaders

*LD0412152995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1305 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Tesanj, 4 Dec (SRNA) — Edhem Bicakcic, deputy chairman of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and until recently a member of the Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina] presidency, last night expressed his concern for future Muslim-Croat relations in the federation in light of the latest personnel changes in Herzeg-Bosna [self-proclaimed Bosnian Croat republic].

He is particularly worried by the decision to nominate Ivo Lozancic as chairman of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Herzeg-Bosna.

"[Former Bosnian Croat HDZ chairman Dario] Kordic had no sympathy for the Bosniak Muslim people, but Lozancic surpasses him in this respect. He was responsible for the expulsion of thousands of Muslims from the Zepce area, and that is why they now call this town Little Vatican," Bicakcic told Muslim radio-Studio Tesanj.

He also said that "the choice of Ivan Bender, a radical Croat" for president of the presidential council of Herzeg-Bosnia instead of moderate Kresimir Zubak, and "placing the leadership of the HDZ in the hands of an extremist such as Lozancic," will lead to deterioration in the relations between the federal partners.

"The citizens of Tesanj can see for themselves that Bender, Lozancic, and people of their ilk are a contributing factor to the divisions among the two nations trying to live together. Until recently the Tesanj Croats were loyal to the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities, but frequent visits by Herzeg-Bosna leaders have transformed them into secessionists and supporters of some kind of autonomy," a worried Bicakcic said in conclusion.

Muslim 'Saboteur' Killed, 2 Wounded on Mt. Ozren

*LD0412174295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1708 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Ozren, 4 Dec (TANJUG) — One member of a Muslim reconnaissance and sabotage group was killed and two were wounded near the village of Porjecina on [Mount] Ozren. The group tried to infiltrate this section of the Ozren battlefield, Serb military sources on Ozren announced.

A statement specifies that the Muslim reconnaissance and sabotage group tried to break through Serb defense lines near the village of Porjecina at 1215. The attack was repelled and the enemy group was routed.

The same source said that the body of the dead Muslim saboteur was taken to the Serb side and three enemy Kalashnikovs were captured.

Serb Radio: Muslims Burning Serb Houses in Ozren

*AU0112215495 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 1 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Muslims have been burning Serb houses and other facilities on the occupied parts of [?Mount] Ozren, which, according to the Dayton demarcation maps, are supposed to be part of the Serb Republic.

From the present demarcation lines, the Muslims are supposed to give back the occupied Serb villages of Krtova and Sizde. Muslims have been burning the Serb houses in those villages for days now. It has also been observed that the remaining Serb property and construction material is being taken away deep into the Muslim territory.

Croats Burning Serb Houses in Western Bosnia

*AU0112185995 Paris AFP in English
1827 GMT 1 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 1 (AFP) — Bosnian Croat militia (HVO) on Friday ransacked and burned more houses of Serbs living in two western Bosnian towns, Sipovo and Mrkonjic Grad, scheduled for return to the Serbs, a UN spokesman said.

"These acts are violations of the Dayton accords. Leaders of the HVO militia told us they would end the acts of vandalism but nothing has changed on the ground," said spokesman Alexander Ivanko.

UN spokesman Chris Vernon said that 20 buildings were burning in the region of Sipovo at the time when the HVO had deployed additional troops in the sector.

For more than a week the United Nations has reported episodes of looting and arson by soldiers. About a dozen homes have been burnt down in Sipovo and Mrkonjic Grad, towns now under Bosnian Croat control. As part of the terms of the Bosnian peace accord signed on November 21 by the Balkan presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, the towns are to be returned to the Serbs.

In the Dayton agreement, there are arrangements to compensate property owners for houses and land damaged or lost in fighting or any land swap.

The Dayton accord will divide Bosnia roughly equally between the Bosnian Serbs and Moslem-Croat federation. Both sides will have to give up swathes of land in an exchange to take place under the auspices of a NATO implementation forces.

Burning '20 Houses a Day'

*LD0412180195 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1522 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec 4 (TANJUG) — U.N. Commander in Bosnia, Brigadier General Richard Dannatt said after visiting Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo, that some 20 houses a day are burned by the Croatian Army in western Bosnia.

The destruction, arsons and looting in those cities started since Croats learnt they would lose the region under the Dayton peace agreement. Dannatt said that he would continue to protest to HVO (Bosnian Croat Militia) leaders 'to try to hold them to their promises to stop the widespread destruction', REUTERS reported.

Bosnian Croat and Muslim forces, with the support of the Croatian Regular Army occupied in the first half of September a large number of Serb towns in West Bosnia from where around 200,000 Serbs were expelled. Dannatt said that the protests have given no results up to now, and that under his current U.N. mandate he 'is not able to deploy soldiers to physically deter arson' in Serb towns.

'Apart from moral persuasion, observing and reporting is all we can do', said Dannatt whose armoured unit is based in Gornji Vakuf, 70 km south-east of Mrkonjic Grad. He added that he did not yet know what more he could do when his U.N. mandate is replaced by NATO duties, because the rules of engagement and conduct in such situations were still to be fixed.

Dannatt said that it will be his problem, 45 days after the NATO mission officially begins in mid-December, how to continue to be in command under a new mandate, and that he is already conducting consultations about his freedom of action. The problem, Dannatt said, is

that Croats are making the situation as difficult as possible by the arsons and lootings in Mrkonjic Grad, the future base of NATO forces, before the arrival of the multinational IFOR forces.

Little will be left for the Serbs when Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo are returned to them, and NATO forces will have to face the bitterness of Serbs returning to a wasteland, REUTERS said quoting U.N. officials.

UN To Open Human Rights Office in Banja Luka

*AU3011082695 Paris AFP in English
0010 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Nov 30 (AFP) — The United Nations human rights commission is to open an office in Banja Luka, the largest town now held by the Bosnian Serbs, UN human rights envoy Elizabeth Rehn announced here Wednesday.

International relief agencies have charged that non-Serbs in the community, located in northern Bosnia, have been driven from their homes under a campaign known as ethnic cleansing.

Rehn said the office would be opened "as soon as possible in order to facilitate the work of the commission" in the Banja Luka region.

Rehn on Thursday is to meet Predrag Radic, the mayor of Banja Luka, as well as Serb, Moslem and Croat religious leaders. She is also scheduled to visit a refugee camp at Rakovacke Bare near here.

Before coming to Banja Luka, Rehn visited the southern Serbian province of Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians have complained of repression and violence at the hands of Serbian police.

On Wednesday she met here with Rajko Kasagic, tipped to become prime minister in a Bosnian Serb republic. Under terms of a US-brokered peace deal, the Serb republic would officially be part of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Officials Assess Reconstruction Needs, Financial Policy

*AU2811093095 Paris AFP in English
0316 GMT 28 Nov 95*

[Report by Jean-Luc Porte]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 28 (AFP) — With the ink hardly dry on the Bosnian peace agreement initialled in Dayton, Ohio, prospective aid donors are already here assessing what needs to be done to rebuild the country's economy shattered by three and a half years of war.

"I am afraid the damage may be worse than was the case in former Yugoslavia during World War II," said Kemal Hrelja, head of the local economic institute.

He calculated that Bosnia required an urgent restoration programme of the order of \$10.5 billion, of which \$3.7 billion would be for the immediate restoration of basic infrastructure.

As an example of the scale of the destruction, he cited the need for about 2.5 square kilometres (one square mile) of glass to replace the windows blown to bits by the shelling of Sarajevo.

The priorities for international aid are reconstruction of the infrastructure and normalisation of Bosnia's financial relations with the international community.

The European Union is expected to play a primordial role in the repair work as well as being a major contributor of funds along with the G7 group of leading industrialised countries and Middle East and North African states keen to help the Bosnian Moslems.

International Monetary Fund deputy director Scott Brown, head of mission in Bosnia, was here at the weekend and said Bosnia would soon join the IMF, perhaps before the end of the year.

Christine Wallich of the World Bank said Bosnia faced major economic structural problems including the

reconversion of communist era systems to a liberal market economy.

Economy Minister Faruk Smailbegovic identified the aims of financing from international organisations as to help resurrect industrial capacity and support a parallel process of privatisation.

Another problem taxing IMF officials for the past few weeks already is how to tackle Bosnia's \$2.9 billion of debt which currently entails hefty annual interest payments so that it can join the fund. Brown has suggested that creditor nations should write it off as a way of normalising Bosnia's financial links with the outside world.

He said solutions also had to be found for problems collectively affecting the Bosnian-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs, such as the return of refugees to their home areas.

The war caused a considerable brain drain, with thousands of academics, engineers, scientists and traders fleeing the country. Among those who stayed, there are many walking wounded, physically and psychologically, for whom it will be difficult to find any work.

Matesa Comments on 'Successful' Visit to U.S.*LD0212131695 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 2 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa and colleagues returned from the United States early this morning. After attending a session of the Croatian Government, he commented on his visit and the talks held there:

[Begin Matesa recording] During my stay I had a number of very important meetings with representatives and senior officials of the U.S. Administration, as well as with senior officials of the World Bank and the IMF, and some other agencies in the United States. The most important thing was a very successful meeting with Vice President Al Gore, at which we considered the overall situation in Croatia and the region, as well as the consequences of the signing of the Dayton agreement, and especially its implications in the economic sphere. The talks were very successful and the Croatian delegation is grateful to the U.S. Administration for its support. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Says Croatia Must Remain Whole*LD0212162695 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 2 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Speaking at a session of the Dubrovacka-Neretva county assembly in Dubrovnik, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic said:

[Begin Granic recording] At Dayton the Serbian delegation, that is, the Serbian and Montenegrin delegation, again raised the issue of Prevlaka. They did not go about saying Prevlaka was part of their territory — there was no question of that — but raised the matter in the form of proposals for a tripartite exchange of territory, in other words the Dubrovnik hinterland for Prevlaka, and the Montenegrins would then give the Bosnian Serbs some territory.

Our basic standpoint was that Croatia must emerge from the talks in its entirety. And Croatia has emerged from the Dayton negotiations fully whole. And when the agreement is signed in Paris, a peace agreement will be signed in which Croatia will be fully whole.

The agreement on the normalization of relations says that two sovereign states can discuss all open issues only if both sides agree to this. I quote the pact on European stability and security: If one state does not accept an issue as a problem then this issue does not exist. [end recording]

Tudjman Receives UN Human Rights Envoy Rehn*LD0412180795 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a statement issued by the office of the president of the Republic.

The president of the Republic received Elisabeth Rehn, the special rapporteur of the UN Commission for Human Rights, in the presidential palace today. She was accompanied by senior human rights officials (Roman Vierusevski) and (Mamadi Diakite). At the beginning of the talks President Tudjman said that developments in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since its break-up represented one of the most intractable crises this century, and that now, after the signing of the basic agreement on the region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem and the initialling of the whole of the Dayton peace agreement, it was important to focus on the future, i.e., on resolving humanitarian issues, building trust, and completely normalizing relations between the states that emerged from former Yugoslavia.

Elisabeth Rehn expressed her full support for the attitude of Croatian state authorities and her wish to concentrate on concrete proposals and the implementation of measures for the realization of the above mentioned goals, rather than to only monitor the events. The talks also dealt with the overall political situation following the signing of the agreements, particularly with the issue of persons gone missing and detained in the Republic of Croatia, the return of refugees from Velika Kladusa — currently accommodated in the refugee camp of Kuplenko — and the issue of putting on trial persons charged with war crimes committed during the greater Serbian aggression against the Republic of Croatia.

Envoy on Srem-Baranja Problems*LD0312210095 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2002 GMT 3 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Erdut, Dec 3 (TANJUG) — U.N. special human rights rapporteur Elisabeth Rehn said in Erdut on Sunday that the difficult questions concerning the Srem-Baranja region (eastern Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem) could not be solved overnight.

Finnish diplomat Elisabeth Rehn was speaking after meeting with the local Serbs' chief negotiator in talks with the Croatian Government Milan Milanovic.

Rehn said that these questions included the quest for missing persons, the return of Croatian refugees and freedom of movement for U.N. and relief agencies' workers.

She stressed that she had paid tribute to the Serb authorities for the enormous efforts they had made to accommodate the refugees, including those who had arrived following the exodus of Serbs from the west of the republic of Serb Krajina in [words indistinct]. The Srem-Baranja region is situated in the east of the Republic of Serb Krajina.

Rehn said it was necessary to restore trust among the people, which should not be a matter of revenge, but one of justice and truth.

On Sunday, Rehn met also with Croats who have remained in the Srem-Baranja region despite the conflict triggered by Croatia's violent secession from former Yugoslavia in 1991.

**Stoltenberg Warns About 'Forgetting'
Srem-Baranja**

LD0512122395 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1140 GMT 5 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Oslo, Dec. 5 (TANJUG) — Co-chairman of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia Thorvald Stoltenberg has warned about the danger of forgetting the Srem-Baranja region because of Bosnia, which may trigger new conflicts.

Stoltenberg told the Norwegian news agency NTB on Monday that the interests and potentials were currently directed towards Bosnia and added that the world community must not forget eastern Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem, part of a state set up by Serbs in Croatia in 1991, after Croatia seceded from the former Yugoslavia.

If the peace agreement on the Srem-Baranja region is not implemented, it may also have negative consequences to the Bosnia peace agreement, initialled in Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, and would result in a big war between Serbia and Croatia, Stoltenberg said.

Under the mediation of Stoltenberg and U.S. Ambassador in Zagreb Peter Galbraith, representatives of the Croatian government and Serbs from the Srem-Baranja region on November 12 signed an agreement to place the region under temporary U.N. administration.

Stoltenberg was speaking on the occasion of an award, which was conferred on him by an Italian-U.S. foundation in Rome on Monday for his contribution to the peace process in the former Yugoslavia.

Serb Negotiator: U.S. Troops Possible in Slavonia

LD0112174195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1618 GMT 1 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Erdut, 1 Dec (TANJUG) — The UN Security Council will pass a resolution on introducing an interim administration in "Sector East" (the Slavonia-Baranja region) only when all details of the administration's composition and mandate are agreed upon, as well as the composition of the international force that will be deployed in the region, U.S. Ambassador to Zagreb Peter Galbraith said in Erdut today. [passage omitted]

Asked whether the resolution on the Srem-Baranja region was linked to the signing of the peace agreement in Paris, Galbraith said that it was not, and that only the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be dealt with in Paris.

Commenting on the replacement of Hrvoje Sarinic, former head of the Croatian president's office, who signed the agreement on the Srem-Baranja district, the U.S. ambassador diplomatically said that, as he understands things, "after having worked 20 hours a day during the difficult negotiations, Sarinic wanted to play a different role, and I sympathize with his decision."

According to Milan Milanovic [chief negotiator of Serbs in eastern Slavonia], there should be three teams in the interim administration: the UN team, a team of representatives of the people of the Srem-Baranja district, and a Croatian Government team.

According to the provisions of the agreement, these three teams will have to cooperate, Milanovic stressed.

He added that the Serb side was advocating that all details relevant for the interim period should be defined over the next 45 days.

Milanovic said that it was possible that U.S. soldiers would be part of the international force that will be deployed in the Srem-Baranja district.

Posavina Demonstrators Target President Tudjman

LD0212233295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 2 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Several thousand displaced residents of Posavina sent a demand from today's protest rally in Zagreb to the Republic of Croatia Assembly and the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina not to accept the part of the Dayton accord on Posavina. [passage omitted]

The rally in Posavina has in fact turned into a rally against President Tudjman himself. This was shown

on the banners the demonstrators carried, which read: "Franjo traitor"; "Franjo, how will you appear before God after Posavina?"; "Tudjman and Prlic, biggest traitors of the Croat people"; "Tudjman is not authorized to sign away parts of other states." The target of the strongest condemnation from the people of Posavina was President Tudjman's statement yesterday that Posavina fell because the army units that were defending it withdrew in spite of his strict orders, as he said, to defend it "even, if need be, house by house." The people of Posavina today are saying the opposite, that the army units withdrew because President Tudjman personally gave the orders. It is not only the people of Posavina who are angry with Tudjman, but also the Croatian opposition as well.

Commentary Urges State To Protect Bosnian Croats

AU0412070395 Zagreb OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian
27 Nov 95 p 22

[Commentary by Jozo Curic: "In the Embrace of Croatia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Orasje is a town of great people, great Croats. Our people have suffered there as well, and they wish for the war to stop as well. However, for days now, dilemmas, negative comments about the negotiations, a number of statements against the agreement have been indicating the bad territorial division for the Croats from Posavina, in which Croats allegedly lose Posavina, or a big part of it. In Orasje and elsewhere, there are a number of unhealed wounds, there are protests because of Posavina, as if it were lost, as if there would be no more Croats in it.

In the former Contact Group plan, nearly all towns of Bosanska Posavina were to belong to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; the so-called corridor was to be 5 to 8 km wide, corrections were planned concerning some Croat villages (around 4,000 people) which the Croat delegation wanted to include in the Federation. But a number of compromises have been made in Dayton, not only in comparison to the Contact Group plan, but also in comparison to the real situation on the ground — just like Richard Holbrooke had announced at the time of his "shuttle diplomacy." How many cities each of the sides has on the terrain — that became an important question at the negotiations, as was later confirmed by Miomir Zuzul, Tudjman's special envoy for negotiations with the Contact Group.

What Milosevic Missed To Say

Thus, the Serbian president announced that Doboj, Modrica, Derventa, [Bosanski] Brod, [Bosanski] Samac,

and Brcko remained in the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but he did not say that that entity would not be able to leave Bosnia. Milosevic did not say that those towns and that entity would be governed by the central government, the parliament, the presidency, the central bank; that in the authorities there would be no Serbs who had committed crimes and broken the law, that the agreement was ousting Karadzic, Koljevic, Plavsic, Krajisnik, and their clique from the government. He did not say that in a few years the strongest money in Posavina would be the Croatian kuna. He did not say that in the future Bosnia-Herzegovina weapons would not be a precondition for the survival and the life of nations. That, at least, is the way the creators of the agreement think, because if it does not happen that way, the division of Bosnia is inevitable.

Those who take a look at the future can say that Croats have realized their main national goals peacefully; now, we indifferently accept the things which in 1992, after the fall of Kupres, we could not even dream of; we vainly criticize everything which has managed to survive and to remain Croatian. The survival of the Croatian state has become a guarantee for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a real basis for the great Croatian economic conquest of Bosnia, particularly of Posavina. It is a guarantee to the Croats of Bosnia that they will not remain alone. The great compromise, initiated by the Washington agreement, can be finalized to the honor and the glory of Croats only if they persist in creating intense ties and a unique security, defense, informative, economic, and cultural sphere between Croatia and the Croats in the new and different Bosnia-Herzegovina — regardless of the entity in which they live. It is possible to say that in the Croat Bosanska Posavina, after the free and direct democratic elections in Bosnia, the Croats in the Serb entity, 100 meters from the Croatian border, will live equally safe and well as the Croats in Herzegovina or in Zagreb. It is possible to envisage some difficulties in the beginning, concerning the return of refugees, the capturing and the trial of the criminals who were ravaging in Posavina. It is possible to envisage the sale or compensation of property, but also the protection by the strong Croatian state, regardless of where Croats live — in Posavina, in Bihac, or in Drvar. In the Croat Bosanska Posavina there can be as many Croats as Croatia is ready to support!

Posavina — Display Window of the West

Posavina can be the display window of the West in the East-oriented Serb entity, it can be the Croat Berlin, in which there must be no deficits. Croats must not be endangered in any way, there will be trade with Croatia, business will be made with Croatian

enterprises; many people will work in Croatia and live in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and vice versa. All those Posavina Croats who decide to live there with dignity, who own 63 percent of land there, who have the strongest protection which the strong Croatian state must give them politically and economically, all those Croats who have never attacked their Serb neighbors first, who are mostly Christians ready to forgive, but who will never forget the crimes — all those Posavina Croats are not, and must not, be alone.

Let this be a private opinion of one journalist: I believe that the Croats from Croat Bosanska Posavina have not been sold — as some people say, that they are not alone, because there is Croatia, which has realized its main national goals. When, in years to come, Croats return and settle in the peaceful Posavina, the entire expatriate Croatia will return together with them. With the strong guarantees and the protection of Zagreb, the Croats in Posavina, Sarajevo, or Grude will be equally hard-working, honest and proud people, they will have their local authorities, they will promote their interests. Especially those great Croats from Posavina, who have never been, and never will be, against the national interests and the success of the Croatian state.

Commentary Examines Division of Bosnian Posavina

*LD0312211295 Zagreb HTV Television
in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Nov 95*

[Unattributed commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] Demonstrations over Bosnian Posavina took place today. Here is a commentary on this current issue:

There are different interpretations as to whether the Croats lost or won Bosnian Posavina with the Dayton agreement, depending on who presents them and in support of which interests. Those who believe that they have lost it proceed from ethic principles, basing them on the allegation that this area belongs to the Croats historically, geographically, and ethnically — in accordance with the 1991 census.

However, even if we establish that this allegation is true, these principles are of little value in politics. Contrary to ethics, politics is dominated by the principles of power and interests. In this case the international community's fundamental interest was peace. Not being sufficiently interested in the implementation of a fair peace, the international community decided in favor of a peace based on the results of the war — in favor of a viable peace.

According to these results, Croats should have been given only the area of the heroically defended Orasje. Despite that fact, it is completely certain now that they are going to get the area of Odzak too, for which Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo have been ceded. The Odzak area of Bosnian Posavina, in addition to the Serb-controlled part of Sarajevo, represents the only territory that evaded being territorially delimited according to the cruel principle of what was gained by force. The Croats of Bosnian Posavina were thus given all the areas where the Croats were the absolute majority population before the war, where 50,000 of the overall number of 142,000 lived. Unlike them, the Muslims as the majority population in Posavina, whose number before the war stood over 145,000, did not get an inch of Bosnian Posavina.

Precisely these facts render senseless all demagogical speculations and tricks about the alleged indifference displayed by the Croatian negotiating team when it came to local Croat population. In continuance of the treatment it has offered so far to all Croat refugees and displaced persons, irrespective of where they come from, including the Posavina people, the Croatian government will carry on looking after them, until they have obtained their own home, whether they decide to return home, go to the Croat part of Bosnian Posavina, or remain in Croatia.

However, as all Croat refugees know, some Posavina people have to become aware of the fact that current personal interests or interests of groups need not be the national interest — by the same token it can be said that Croatia's interests need not be tantamount to international interests. It is beyond any doubt that Posavina people's suffering has been enormous. Therefore, their demonstrations are understandable. But the Croats still have the most important and currently largest part of Bosnian Posavina. History neither begins nor ends with Dayton, because Posavina has to rely on Croatia, and whether it will again be Croatian in its entirety depends primarily on us. The Slavonia and Baranja people, as all other Croatian refugees have been aware of the fact all these long wartime years. There is no reason why the Posavina people should not understand the same.

UNHCR Sadako Ogata Meets With Croatian Officials

*AU0512104695 Paris AFP in English
0937 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec 5 (AFP) — The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata was meeting here Tuesday with government officials to discuss the repatriation of thousands of Bosnian refugees who fled their homes to Croatia.

Ogata, who is on the second leg of her trip to the Balkans, was to meet with Foreign Minister Mate Granic early Tuesday and with President Franjo Tudjman at midday.

A UNHCR official said that high on her agenda would be the fate of some 200,000 Moslem Bosnians at the Kupljensko refugee camp 60 kilometers (35 miles) south of Zagreb. Most of the refugees are from the northwest Bosnian region of Velika Kladusa, the stronghold of rebel Moslem leader Fikret Abdic.

They fled to Croatia's Krajina region last summer following a Bosnian government offensive on their area and since then have refused to return to their homes for fear of retaliation by Bosnians who regard them as traitors.

Under an agreement reached between the Bosnian and Croatian government last month, a multinational force made up of Croatian, Bosnian and Turkish troops is to police the Velika Kladusa region and monitor the return of the refugees. Turkish troops were due to arrive in Zagreb Tuesday before heading to northwest Bosnia, the HINA news agency said.

Ogata said in Sarajevo Monday that repatriation of the estimated 1.2 million people forced to flee their homes during the four-year conflict was crucial and the UNHCR would be in overall charge of that operation.

"Now that peace has come we have been asked to bring to bring them back and try to help start a peaceful process of reconciliation among the people, which is not going to be easy," she said.

She was to travel to Belgrade later Tuesday on the last leg of her three-day trip in the region.

Discusses Issues With Granic

*LD0512124495 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of the Republic of Croatia, today held talks with Sadako Ogata, UN high commissioner for refugees. The talks were attended by Adalbert Rebic, head of the government's office for refugees, and his deputy Damir Zoric.

Minister Granic said that now, after the Dayton negotiations, we are closer to peace than in any other period over the last five years. The most important thing for the Republic of Croatia at this moment is the reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem in its constitutional and legal order, Granic said, and added that Croatia is prepared to cooperate with international organizations in developing the process which will be

helped by the normalization of relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Ogata was particularly interested in humanitarian issues in the Republic of Croatia and the region in connection with the Dayton agreement. She said that the implementation of the agreement will create conditions for the return of a considerable number of refugees and expressed hope that the UNHCR and the Croatian Government would continue their successful cooperation in solving humanitarian problems.

It is very important for the Republic of Croatia that conditions be created for the safe return of refugees to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Minister Granic said. He added that the first to return should be those who had found shelter in Croatia, followed by those accommodated in western Europe.

Armed Forces To Cut Forces by 42,000

*LD0412151395 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Defense and National Security Council held its first session, chaired by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in the presidential palace in Zagreb today.

The council reviewed the functioning of the state administration in connection with the unsuccessful setting up of the assembly of the city of Zagreb and the assembly of Zagreb county. It called on the Government of the Republic of Croatia to make possible unhindered work of the current leaderships of the city and the county and of all specialized services, as well as to ensure the observance of legal procedures in the process of the setting up of both assemblies.

The council also established that following the liberation of the [formerly] occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia, it was necessary to clear mines, as one of the basic conditions for the economic recovery of the war-stricken areas. The council was told that around 3 million antitank and antipersonnel mines had been laid during the war for the homeland, and more than 1 million artillery shells had been fired, at least 10 percent of which have not exploded. Around 200,000 mines have been cleared since the beginning of the war, but 400 people have been killed in mine explosions. Considering the complexity and enormity of the task of clearing the mines, and since this is a technical and very important task that requires a planned approach, the council concluded that the Government of the Republic of Croatia should set up an expert civilian service, whose work will be coordinated by the Ministry of Development and Reconstruction in cooperation with the Ministries of Interior and Defense.

The council also discussed the state of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia. The council established that the successful policy pursued so far by the president of the Republic and the Croatian leadership has led to considerable changes in general circumstances and brought about the end of the war, which had a considerable impact on improving national security.

Consequently, conditions have been reached to cut down the number of troops of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia by 42,000 next month. The Defense Ministry has been tasked with reviewing further possibilities of reducing personnel and mobilized technical equipment. This decision will contribute to a reduction in the expenditures from the budget and encourage the reconstruction of war-stricken areas, as well as the overall development of the Croatian economy.

New Members Appointed to HDZ Presidency

*LD0412164295 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In accordance with the statute of the presidency of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ], additional members were appointed to

the presidency from among the members of the HDZ Central Committee at a session held yesterday which was chaired by Franjo Tudjman.

The presidency now consists of the following people:

Chairman Franjo Tudjman; Vice Chairmen Gojko Susak, Mate Granic, Ivic Pasalic, Franjo Greguric, Jadranka Kosor; Secretary-general Ivan Valent; Speaker of the Assembly Vlatko Pavletic; Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa; Chairman of the [HDZ] deputies group in the assembly's Chamber of Deputies Ivan Milas; President of the assembly's Chamber of Counties Katica Ivanisevic; Chairman of the [HDZ] deputies group in the assembly's Chamber of Counties Ivan Aralica; President of the HDZ Youth Organization Mario Kapulica; Deputy Speaker of the assembly's Chamber of Deputies Vladimir Seks; Head of the president's office Ivo Sanader; Presidential adviser Zlatko Canjuga; and Assembly deputy Marino Golob. [passage omitted]

The presidency discussed current political issues, especially as regards international activities concerning implementation of the Dayton agreement and the setting up of the assemblies of the city of Zagreb and of Zagreb county.

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FBIS-EEU-95-233

5 December 1995

Ambassador to UN on U.S. World 'Leadership'

AU0512083095 Skopje MIC in English 4 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] to the UN Denko Maleski stated on Friday that the U.S. cannot withdraw from the leading position in the world and the Balkans.

The motive was the routine meeting of the UN Security Council, which unanimously approved the 6-month continuation of the mandate for 1,100 UN soldiers, including almost 500 Americans. He also said that the EU "still lacks a joint stance for the resolution of the crisis situation on the Continent, while the U.S. cannot withdraw from the leadership, because if a leading power does not lead, the rest cannot follow."

Without mentioning Greece, Maleski mentioned the question of the long-term dispute in relation to Macedonia's name and former flag, which Athens assessed expressed aspirations towards the northern Greek province Macedonia.

"After a certain period of time, which seemed like eternity to us, we received support from the UN and became its member, but under an odd name, we are addressed with the name FYROM, because one member opposes our name."

Commentary Sees Dayton Opening 'Pandora's Box'

*AU0512085295 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA
in Macedonian 2 Dec 95 p 13*

[Commentary by Zoran Andonovski: "Good and Bad News"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is finally clear what Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] can expect after the signing of the peace agreement in Dayton, the impulses and contours of the colossal compromise that was made behind the iron fence of the until yesterday unknown air force base in Ohio. The Dayton accord means an end of war for the population in Bosnia, but the signing of the accord brings good and bad news for Macedonia. First of all, the good news: If peace is finally to be established in Bosnia, it will mean peace in the region and conditions for the stable development of our country without the permanent threat of the war spreading. The north-south corridor will open and our northern border will be de-blocked. So, there are no dilemmas about the positive effects of the Dayton agreement on Macedonia and the region. However, nothing is so simple or so black and white. Over the last four years, we ourselves and our business have learned how to live and manage in semi-war conditions, a region that is near to a military base

and part of a high-risk zone because of the possibility of the war spreading. The latest edition of the U.S. weekly *TIME*, for instance, puts Macedonia at the top of the list of possible countries and regions where U.S. troops might be sent after Bosnia; our country comes before the Golan Heights, Cuba, Taiwan, the Caucasuses, Kurdistan, etc. *TIME* justifies this high position on the list by saying that the "Bosnia solution does not guarantee peace in Macedonia or Kosovo. The Serbs may restart 'ethnic cleansing' and precipitate another crisis."

After Dayton, it seems that Pandora's box is slowly opening for Macedonia and, one by one, all the problems, disputed questions, and surprises are coming out. The lifting of the sanctions, for instance, took the gray economy by surprise, then there were the problems with Serbian customs (we were surprised to be treated by the FRY as a "foreign country," as an independent state, and to be treated equally with other states), Croatia has unexpectedly recognized the continuity of the FRY, and the question of succession has opened up with the fully justified efforts by the successor states to inherit part of the property of the defunct state and the understandable efforts of the one who holds all the keys to grab it all for itself. All this is bad news for Macedonia from Dayton. The analysts knew that this news would be communicated to Macedonia shortly after peace in Bosnia and the stabilization of the region had been achieved.

What is left for little Macedonia now? Has it been cheated? Is the history of the destinies of smaller Slav tribes (although not as much as at the beginning of the century) repeating itself and will the big ones, Serbia and Croatia, be the ones to decide? What promises was Milosevic given in Ohio for his concessions? Is our government familiar with them? Have we been promised anything (and what?) in return for not making too much of a fuss about continuity and succession and, therefore, if, for instance, Macedonia's share "amounts" to \$300 million, will less be offered through various programs and projects? Could we expect Tudjman to be sensitive to Macedonia's problems and needs? To get Slavonia, he will bypass far bigger issues than us!

Finally, is it so important for Macedonia to know about the events in Dayton and about the "bargain" between Milosevic and Tudjman under the sponsorship of the United States? In addition to the unclear interpretations of Croatia's recognition of continuity and Slovenia's diplomatic recognition of the FRY, we will have to wait to see how much all this has to do with the division of property. Nevertheless, if, despite everything, the mutual recognition of all the newly created states occurs in the coming days or immediately after the signing of the "Bosnian peace" in Paris, it will be further evidence and indication that the succession problem is to be left

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for later agreements or even international arbitration. Macedonia's stance on the succession, at least as far as its official stance is concerned, is laid down in the constitutional law that says that "Macedonia, as a legal successor to the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], undertakes all the rights and obligations that emanated from the creation of the SFRY on an equal footing with all the other republics," and that in relation to the succession "it will decide on the rights and obligations in agreement with all the other republics." Of course, it is very important for Macedonia to know if it is part of a Dayton or post-Dayton package, but for now there are no indications that any deal was done on its behalf there.

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to compare Dayton to Pandora's Box in the case of Macedonia, because the only thing that was left in the box after all the evil had left was Hope. At least that (Hope) is not hidden here....

Model for Solving Kosovo 'Problem' Offered

AU0512101095 Skopje VECER in Macedonian
2-3 Dec 95 pp 4-5

[Commentary by Branko Geroski: "'Macedonization' of Kosovo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The agreement among Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic should be put first of all in the context of the solution of the crisis in Bosnia and Croatia. The Serbian leader received a difficult assignment—to restrain the militant leaders of the Bosnian Serbs and to guarantee peace. The price of Milosevic's "peacemaking"—the suspension of the sanctions against Yugoslavia—was paid without any complaints. Many observers believe that this is not all. The assumption is that the Serbian leader has become more benevolent and that he will not be disturbed, at least for some time, with the "Kosovo question." There are others who fear that the ambitions of the Albanians are being sacrificed in the name of peace in the Balkans, that Kosovo's hotbed of crisis will be put aside, and that there will be temporary "firemen's" interventions with the aim of stopping a possible war fire.

Kosovo's Fear

As we know, with the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989, the prelethal agony of former Yugoslavia began. In 1992 the Albanians in Kosovo proclaimed their "Republic of Kosovo," followed by a strong wave of repression by the Serbian authorities. It is believed that today tens of thousands of federal policemen protect the "peace" in the province. In 1993 Milosevic expelled the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission from Kosovo in order to avoid unpleasant

independent reports on human rights violations in the "core of Serbia," where over 90 percent of the population is Albanian.

Since that time Kosovo has been ruled by fear. In spite of some modest efforts, the Albanians in Kosovo have not succeeded in starting a fruitful dialogue either with the authorities in Belgrade or with the Serbian opposition. The goal of Kosovo leader Ibrahim Rugova—an independent and neutral Kosovo under international protectorate, equally opened toward Serbia and Albania—terrifies the Serbian politicians. For now the insistence on this option deprives the Albanians of an efficient international support for their struggle for the accomplishment of elementary human rights, which are now brutally taken away from them in the province.

The impression is that the international community could have exerted greater pressure on the Serbian authorities for the revitalization of the suspended right to political autonomy of the Albanians, if it itself had not been under pressure by the knowledge that the option of an "independent Kosovo" is leading to a new hotbed of crisis in the Balkans. The Americans have already sent a signal to the Albanians in Kosovo that the only acceptable solution for the most powerful world's factor is greater autonomy in order to keep the question of "independent Kosovo" off the agenda of the forthcoming peace conference in Paris (where the Dayton peace is to be verified).

Turning to Reality

The Kosovo leader Rugova, partly because of what he personally believes, but more likely because of the pressure from more radical Kosovo leaders (like Rexhep Qosja, for instance), announces that he will not give up the intention of creating an independent Albanian state in Kosovo. If the expected happens in Paris (the Kosovo problem to be treated as a problem of human rights plus autonomy), there may follow some turbulences on the Kosovo political scene and conflicts between Rugova and his critics—either the radical ones or those who think that the option of an "independent Kosovo" is losing support in the world (Veton Suroi is one of them, for instance). The outcome of this struggle may be a final turning of the Albanians in Kosovo toward something that can really be accomplished, on the basis of the international community's platform which might be created in Paris, and which can be spotted also in the Dayton agreement.

This turning point will have an enormous influence on the perspectives for a definite solution of the "Albanian question" in the region. Tirana will probably agree with the new international community's formula on Kosovo.

Albanian President Sali Berisha offered the Albanian seaports and airports in support of NATO actions for peace in Bosnia immediately after the adoption of the Dayton agreement, and thus he confirmed that Albania wants to share in the efforts of the international community for peace in the region. This can also be taken as an announcement that Tirana will either publicly or clandestinely support all solutions under the fatal influence of its most powerful ally—the United States, including those that are related to Kosovo.

In the meantime Tirana has sent similar and new signals regarding its relations with Skopje. Saban Murati, Albanian ambassador to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], recently made a positive assessment about relations between the two countries, adding that the "national and human rights of the Albanians should be fulfilled," and that "Albania has always supported the actions of the Macedonian authority aimed at fulfilling various requests of the Albanians."

A Chance for Realist Politicians

It may be too daring to speculate that this statement reflects Tirana's real expectations of the Paris conference. It seems that Albania understands that the formula which is functioning in Macedonia, despite all weaknesses and inconsistencies—dialogue, participation of the Albanians in the institutions of the system, struggle for a higher level of human rights and freedoms—can be an optimum solution also for the relations in Kosovo. The relative success in Macedonia, where peace, security, and perspectives have been safeguarded, will ease the task of the Albanian politicians in promoting this optimum formula for Kosovo. Normally, all problems will not be solved (there are also serious problems in Macedonia), but the "Macedonization of Kosovo" is a formula which promises more success and support of the international community than the formula "Kosovization of Macedonia."

This constellation would be a new, exceedingly favorable chance for the political leadership of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia who, urged by their own experiences (the good and bad included), might even head the process of creating such a formula for Kosovo and its promotion on the international scene. This chance should be used not just for the sake of "helping" Macedonia, but for creating credibility that they could further use in fulfilling their demands inside Macedonia.

The outcome of the Dayton peace process will probably be a disappointment for the Albanian politicians who are firmly turned to the option of an "independent Kosovo." This disappointment will arouse a wave of disapprovals in Pristina (probably also in Tirana, where Berisha is

facing elections in the next year). In such a factory of emotions, the realist politicians will naturally be on the second plan. They will get their chance if they restrain their emotions, if they do not lose their political identity in the meantime, by making calculations with short-term political effects.

In any way, the problems of Kosovo, undoubtedly defined on the basis of a platform that does not accept the creation of new state entities and changing of borders in the Balkans (particularly not now, after a four-year bloody war), will come on the agenda, which will represent a real chance for the realist politicians. They have strong arguments at hand—since 1990, according to REUTER, activists engaged in human rights in Kosovo have registered over 500 cases in which Albanians were charged for political beliefs. This fact is quite sufficient for inciting the world public. A confirmation of this is that a few days ago a special UN reporter on human rights stayed in the province and expressed his "concern" about the ethnic tensions in Kosovo. In one word, the Albanian politicians will soon get permission and a space to play the "game." Everything else will depend on their ability to use the chance in the best way.

Slovene Official Views Dayton, SFRY Succession

AU0512084295 Skopje MIC in English 4 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Slovenia Ignjac Golob, stayed in Skopje last Thursday [30 November] and Friday [1 December]. During his stay, Golob was received in separate meetings by Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski, Defence Minister Blagoy Handziski and Finance Minister Jane Miljovski.

Crvenkovski and Golob exchanged opinions on the current situation in the region and the signing of the Dayton agreement. In this context, Golob informed about the decision of his Government to recognize FR Yugoslavia [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—FRY], whereby it is emphasized that this does not mean that the Slovenian stance in relation to the question of continuity and succession of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] is changed.

The meeting with Handziski focused on the part of the Dayton Agreement, the document "Agreement on regional stability," which, among the rest, treats the question of the embargo and the realization of the limit of the military potentials of FRY, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The two sides agreed to interpret this part of the Agreement as an immediate lifting of the embargo on the import and export of arms for Macedonia and Slovenia. Furthermore, they agreed that the limit of

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the military potentials of FRY, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina does not apply to Macedonia and Slovenia, and decided to jointly ask the international institutions for an interpretation of the two questions.

In the talks with Miljevski, it was jointly stated that the finance ministers of both countries have sent letters to the ministers of 35 countries, appealing to them not to allow the use of the foreign currency reserves of the FRY, until the question over the succession to the property between all former SFRY countries is resolved. As a result of that, we already have information from some countries that withdrawals from the foreign currency reserves will not be allowed. Civil suits are also being instituted in the competent countries in which there are foreign reserves. Slovenia and Macedonia have also taken a joint stance to regulate the succession to former SFRY, which is in their mutual interest.

Diplomatic Ties With Israel To Start 'Soon'

AU0512083195 Skopje MIC in English 4 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Israel will soon establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level. The establishment of diplomatic relations was agreed at the Friday [1 December] meeting between Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski and the delegation of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, which, led by Nathan Neron, stayed on a working visit to Macedonia.

The meeting centered around opinions on the cooperation between the two countries, the situation in the region of the Balkans and the Near East, as well as some questions from the activities on a multilateral plan.

During its stay in RM [Republic of Macedonia], the Israeli delegation held talks and meetings with representatives of the Jewish community in Macedonia and the Association of Macedonian-Israeli friendship, and visited the NOVA MAKEDONIJA editorial offices.

Police Carry Out Raid Linked to Gligorov Bombing

AU0412183595 Skopje MIC in English 4 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] An extensive police raid started in the Skopje suburb Kisela Voda at three o'clock in the morning, aimed at discovering new details linked with the assassination attempt on President Gligorov on October 3.

The action that was carried out by regular police units, in coordination with the traffic police, was conducted in the suburbs Kisela Voda, 11 October, Crniche, Przhino, Pintija and Pripor. During the day, the police searched some 3,000 garages, basements and shacks, a couple of

thousand cars, while passers by were also stopped and I.D.

VECER talked with some of the garage owners whose garages were searched, finding out that the police were interested in scissors for cutting wire, resellers of spare car parts, registered and "illegal" car services, and took samples from the sand in some cellars and backyards.

The police handed out a photograph of a person linked with the assassination attempt on President Gligorov to the citizens, which looks like the photo-fit of the buyer of the AMI from the Skopje used-car market. The photograph had the telephone No. 120-120 written on the back side, the contact-number people can call in case they have any information linked with the perpetrator.

The police action was ordered by the chief of the Investigation Department in the District Court in Skopje, who is directly in charge of the court investigation, judge Zdravko Vasilev.

Almost 50 Percent Unemployment in Kriva Palanka

96BA0012C Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA

in Macedonian 24 Oct 95 p 5

[Article by Z. Cvetkovska: "Same Number of Employed and Unemployed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As a result of liquidations and restructuring of enterprises, the number of employed in the Kriva Palanka township has declined from 6500 to 5400, as compared to 5200 unemployed.

Kriva Palanka, October.

The unfavorable state of the economy, largely due to the blockades and embargoes on the northern and southern borders, led to a large number of bankruptcies and the inevitable restructuring of production capacities in the country, emphasizing the problem of increased unemployment. That is why, in the past few years in the Kriva Palanka township, the number of employed individuals has declined by about 1000. Currently, only 5400 of the 6500 working people are employed: 3500 in the [state-controlled] economy, 1350 in noneconomic [services] activities, and 550 in the private sector. Similarly, there has been a steady increase in the number of unemployed, so that currently the Employment Institute has registered 5200 individuals seeking work.

A total of 324 individuals became unemployed because of bankruptcies, 262 at the Vera Jovic Carpet Manufacturing Enterprise, and 62 at the Palancanka MK [local cooperative]. In these two enterprises bankruptcy proceedings began in July 1993. However, the necessary equalization has still not been completed. At the Vera Jovic Carpet Manufacturing Enterprise, most of the debt

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owed to creditors has been paid, but not funds owed to the employees.

Although funds owed the employees are currently being paid, some employees have rejected the guaranteed personal income and are demanding payments based on the court decision, which are three to four times higher. The payment of such sums could lead to the bankruptcy of the enterprise, especially if this is related to the problem of marketing the finished goods. In the case of the Palancanka MK which, unlike the carpetmaking enterprise, has a guaranteed market in England, employees here as well have not been paid. However, there are prospects for reaching an agreement on the basis of which employees will not claim old salaries, thus making possible mandatory equalization and regular employment. It is expected that the lifting of the blockades will create conditions for finding new markets and successfully completing the bankruptcy procedures. This will create conditions for the reemployment of laid-off workers, some of whom have already been rehired.

In the Kriva Palanka township the Law on Losing Enterprises affected the two largest enterprises, the Toranca ROC [expansion unknown] and the Karpos TK [textile combine]; losing enterprises also included branches of the Tito MZ [metallurgical plant] and the Crvena Zvezda ZIK [agroindustrial combine] from Stip. Following the restructuring of these capacities, 715 workers in the township became unemployed, including 141 at the Toranica ROC, 483 at the Karpos TK, and 118 at the branches of the poultry farm of the Tito MZ in Skopje. Of the registered workers considered redundant or laid off because of bankruptcy, 350 individuals will seek the right to monetary compensation until reemployment or until they qualify for pensions after 25 years of work.

At the same time, with a decrease in employment, the number of unemployed in the township is increasing. Most of them are young people under 30 who, unfortunately for the time being, have no prospects whatsoever of finding work and securing their existence.

Daily Outlines Polish-Ukrainian Relations

WS0412160595 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 22 Nov 95 p 9

[Article by Grzegorz Gromadzki: "Caution, Ukraine!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukrainian Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk visited Warsaw. Although the purpose was to take part in the Central European Initiative summit, he held "very successful" talks with the Polish prime minister. The defense ministers of both states met in Poland. They announced the formation of a joint peacekeeping battalion. The Advisory Committee support to the two presidents, long dormant, has become active. Contacts have subsided over the last few weeks, but there is a justifiable excuse: the elections in Poland.

Several Lackluster Years

After the euphoria that erupted when Ukraine gained independence four years ago and signed the 1992 treaty and many other agreements, a period of—putting it lightly—stagnation set in. Post-Solidarity politicians blamed the Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party coalition for the chilly relations with Kiev. The charges are legitimate, but neither did cooperation between Kiev and Warsaw flourish during Hanna Suchocka's government.

Presidents Lech Walesa and Leonid Kravchuk both considered forming a bloc of Central and East European states. However, from the very beginning it was clear that the idea was utopian. Poland was baffled by Walesa's concept of NATO-II. When Walesa did not even mention the idea during his visit to Kiev in May 1993, his hosts realized that entering a bloc with the Poles to protect Ukraine from Russia was unworkable.

Now and then there resurfaces the concept of one country reaching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, but on both sides of the Bug River it is raised by people who do not have even the slightest influence on the foreign policies of their states. Once the utopian idea was given up, no formula for real cooperation that would be more than "friendly and fruitful relations" was developed.

Paralyzed by Fear

Russia's protests to our entering NATO, raised for two years now, are partly responsible for the difficulties in developing cooperation with Kiev. Moscow considers Ukraine to be within its sphere of influence. Warsaw was thus hesitant to approach Kiev with any offers.

Another factor was the recurring thought in some Polish heads that it is not worth the risk because our eastern neighbor is a "one-season state" that will fall into Russia's hands sooner or later. This opinion won more

supporters when Leonid Kuchma became president the previous summer, having spoken volumes about the necessity of good relations with Moscow throughout his campaign.

When it turned out that Kuchma did not have the slightest intention of becoming a Russian puppet, Warsaw hardly realized this, and, as late as last spring, the Polish Embassy in Kiev still hinted that Ukraine's role in European politics was diminishing.

Old habits of some of the members of the coalition currently ruling in Poland cause them to see eastern policy only as Russian policy.

Ukrainian Inhibitions

The Ukrainians were very critical of the Polish-Russian agreement (initialed by Suchocka's government and signed by Pawlak) on the construction of a gas pipeline from Siberia to West Europe. They saw it as tantamount to treason. The line is to lead through Belarus. The gas lines running through Ukraine, meanwhile, are Kiev's trump card in negotiations with Russia.

In Kravchuk's time, Polish politicians and diplomats often complained that, despite the fact that he and his team were very well disposed toward us, it was difficult to find politicians in Kiev who would clearly state what they wanted. The previous fall, however, Kuchma decided to ask the West for help in reforming the Ukrainian economy. He wanted to talk most of all with the United States and Canada and, in Europe, with Germany. We were not on their list.

It is sometimes difficult to talk with people who are becoming successful. The Ukrainian elites are shaking off the inferiority complex of feeling like a province of Moscow. President Kuchma is ambitious. In the USSR, he was the director of one of the largest rocket production companies in the world, and, currently, despite the fact that the Ukrainian treasury is empty, he is still considering a space project. He is thus beginning to feel like an equal partner of those who hold power in this world.

A Ukrainian diplomat told me that two or three years ago his French colleagues still doubted whether Ukraine existed as a state. Nobody in the West doubts that any longer. Relations between Kiev and Russia are bad, even though officially the diplomats are exchanging niceties.

Change After All

It seemed that relations between Warsaw and Kiev would remain in limbo. But things have changed. President Bill Clinton went to Kiev straight from Moscow last May. He and his delegation clearly stated

at the time that they treated Ukraine seriously. They saw our eastern neighbor as an important element of the European security system.

In the summer, the Americans began encouraging us to establish closer relations with the Ukrainians. Warsaw was very attentive of the special cooperation program that Kiev signed in September with NATO, similar to the one Russia had entered (providing for, among others, 16 plus 1 consultations—between all the NATO member states on one side and Ukraine on the other).

The impact this had on the intensity of our contacts with Kiev is hardly surprising. After all, Poland must account for the opinions of its future partners from NATO and the EU.

One of the shortcomings of Polish policies over the past two years were feeble attempts to advertise Ukraine in the West. Had we been more decisive, perhaps Western politicians would have realized the importance of having partnership relations with Ukraine earlier. We could thus have proved it was worth taking our opinions on the East into consideration and won the respect and gratitude of the Ukrainians. We could also have done many things unrelated to politics—for instance, open a Polish Cultural Institute in Kiev. There was no money for that, however.

The "sin of neglect," it seems, is a thing of the past. The Polish delegation contributed to the admission of Ukraine to the European Council by convincing the "disinclined." Warsaw also orchestrated the approval to admit Kiev into the Central European Initiative, which will officially take place next year.

We are thus striking points with Ukraine, especially because the Ukrainians openly state they intend to join all the Pan-European organizations they can. The support they lent us when we applied for nonpermanent membership on the EU Security Council proves they know how to show gratitude.

What Now?

During his 20 November news conference, Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk refused to comment on the results of the Polish presidential elections. He only announced that he would soon meet with Prime Minister Oleksy. This meeting will allow the Ukrainians to judge whether Polish-Ukrainian relations will change now that Kwasniewski has been elected. And, if so, to what extent. So much for Marchuk.

The worst thing that could happen to the Ukrainians would be a Polish-Russian rapprochement over their heads. Therefore, the basic question for now is: Will Kwasniewski and his foreign minister, whose name we

still do not know, think like many of his colleagues from the SLD, who see only Moscow in the East? Will they surround themselves with people holding similar views? We shall soon see.

Follow the German Example

Regardless of who is president in Poland, it would be worthwhile to formulate several conclusions of a general nature.

It seems that, in our relations with Ukraine, we should follow the example of Germany, adopt the same policy Germany is applying to us. Its support for our entrance into NATO and the EU are largely due to "healthy egoism." German leaders do not want their country to be a buffer between a safe and wealthy Western Europe [and an unstable and poor Eastern Europe]. In view of our future integration with West European institutions, we have no choice but to do the same and strongly support Ukraine's admission to the West.

Many of our influential politicians who think that only Russia counts in the East are simultaneously demanding that the West treat Poland not as a sphere of Russian influence but as a fully independent state.

Kiev Has No Choice

Rapprochement with the West, which naturally has to take place via Poland, is the only chance Ukraine stands of keeping its independence. The Ukrainians thus do not have much choice. If they are serious about joining the West, they must have good relations with us. Poland is also the most important state in this region, which the Ukrainians are increasingly aware of.

Of course, there are and will be differences of opinion between us. The best example at the moment is the issue of Poland's swift entry into NATO. The Ukrainian *raison d'état* is different from ours in this respect. Kiev wants close-knit cooperation with the alliance, yet it realizes very well that it cannot even dream of joining it for the time being. It is afraid that Poland might become a member soon, because then Ukraine would be left stranded between NATO and Russia, vulnerable to stronger pressure from Moscow.

Hence, the staunch Ukrainian stance on the possibility that nuclear arms will be deployed in Hungary and Poland—albeit it is a highly theoretical idea—once the two states join NATO. By no means does this reaction, so similar to that of Moscow, indicate a rapprochement between Russia and Ukraine!

The Necessity of Realpolitik

We should adopt realpolitik in our relations with Ukraine without resorting to lofty slogans or looking

to the past—the bad past, but also one we shared. We should simply understand that just beyond our border is one of the largest European states, currently suffering from a deep economic crisis, but which constitutes a key element of the European security system, particularly in our part of the continent.

President-Elect Criticized for Avoiding Media

WS0412152195 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 4 Dec 95 p 4

[Article by Eliza Olczyk: "Aleksander Kwasniewski's Information Policy; Reticence in Front of Media"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *The president-elect can speak foreign languages. He took advantage of this fact during the election campaign—he often stressed that President Lech Walesa cannot speak them. It seems that Aleksander Kwasniewski not only can speak foreign languages, but also actually speaks them and does this quite readily. Two weeks have already passed since the elections and the president-elect has not yet met with Polish journalists at a news conference. Nor has he given any interviews to the Polish press. The only exception is the interview published in POLITYKA. However, he has given numerous interviews to the foreign press.*

Aleksander Kwasniewski avoids the Polish media, reported the French AFP agency in a 27 November news bulletin. Thus, the president-elect's unique information policy—openness to the foreign media and avoidance of Polish journalists—has been noticed not only in Poland but also abroad. Symptoms of the president-elect's aversion to the Polish media could be seen even before the elections. After the elections, the issue became completely clear. Despite earlier announcements that a news conference for Polish journalists would be called immediately after the official election results were made known, there was no such conference. Nor did we see a conference that Aleksander Kwasniewski's campaign staff vaguely announced would take place in the middle of the second week after the elections. The Polish people had a chance to see the president-elect when he was making a statement at a meeting with members of his campaign staff, which was closed to the press, and when he was talking on the telephone with U.S. President Bill Clinton. All other information came to Poland from various parts of the world. [passage omitted]

Who Is Punished?

Instead of interviews for the press, Aleksander Kwasniewski is declaring support for solid and impartial journalism. This declaration was included in his letter to TRYBUNA, where the president-elect thanked the daily's journalists for their work during the election

campaign. Kwasniewski emphasized in the letter that, even though TRYBUNA had supported his candidacy in the presidential elections, "this engagement did not cause it to lose from sight the primary goal of journalism, which is the provision of objective and impartial information to readers."

That is enough as far as declarations are concerned. Meanwhile, because it is receiving no information whatsoever, the Polish press is preoccupied primarily with election protests and deliberations as to whether Aleksander Kwasniewski graduated from a university (right now no one is questioning the fact that he has not defended his master's thesis). No wonder that after nearly a week's silence, the president-elect's interview for POLITYKA was announced a few days before it actually appeared and that it was looked upon as an extraordinary event. Is this a sign of his future information policy, in line with which every statement the president-elect makes for the Polish media will be a big event?

The alleged reason the president-elect does not want to meet with Polish journalists is that he does not want questions about personnel issues or about his education. However, these questions do come up in interviews with foreign journalists and the president answers them. Why, then, are there no meetings with the Polish media? Is this punishment for their unfavorable approach during the election campaign? If so, who is really being punished—the media or the public?

Aleksander Kwasniewski has often said that ignoring the media means, in fact, ignoring the people. When did he say that? Well, he said that when the post of prime minister was held by Waldemar Pawlak, who became known for being dead silent on nearly all subjects. The general opinion at that time was that the prime minister was suffering from a complex about Aleksander Kwasniewski—Kwasniewski was perceived as an eloquent, brilliant person who did not evade journalists and who always answered questions from the press. Waldemar Pawlak, whom the Democratic Left Alliance so readily criticized for his information policy, can congratulate himself today. His rival, as soon as he was elected president, started evading Polish journalists as efficiently as the former prime minister did when he was in office. After all, there is more to an information policy than interviews with foreign media. Foreign journalists ask questions about what their readers (Germans, Italians, French) are most interested in; the Polish people are less interested in those subjects. Thus, by the president-elect's decision, the Polish people have been placed last in line as far as access to information is concerned. Of course, Polish readers can always learn something from foreign

interviews, as well. This is because journalists all over the world have one thing in common: They are most interested in those issues that are controversial, ignored, or concealed.

Cardinal Glemp Views Kwasniewski Victory

WS0512114095 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 27 Nov 95 p 17

[Interview with Polish Primate Cardinal Jozef Glemp by Tomasz Krolak and Bogumil Lozinski of the Catholic Information Agency; place and date not given: "We Will Not Call Upon People To Make a Revolution"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [KAI] As primate of Poland and head of the episcopate, do you not feel personally upset or grieved by the choice made by the majority of society on 19 November?

[Glemp] I do not feel either upset or grieved. Several years ago, I said that Polish society was morally sick. The process of overcoming the disease that particularly affects people's consciousness is still going. The election demonstrated the actual differentiation in our society with regard to national values, as well as group, religious, and economic values. Every average Pole's final decision was based on very superficial motives.

[KAI] However, the election demonstrated that the split involves the entire society....

[Glemp] Poland split into two halves during the election; however, it was a split "for now." The division was prompted by emotions, hence euphoria on the part of the leftists and depression on the part of the rightists. There is common concern about the future: Rightists are afraid of real socialism, while leftists are afraid that they will be faced with active opposition and will not be able to cope with carrying the weight of responsibility for the state. Can those fears be overcome? Of course, given that fears are based on passionate emotions, and, when emotions become weaker, reason comes to the front. Reason is deeper than emotions, therefore the demagogic appeal: "Let us go build Poland together!" is not enough.

[KAI] However, society chose the very candidate who advocated the slogan "common Poland," the postcommunist candidate. Do you believe the role of emotions was significant in the outcome of the election?

[Glemp] I believe it was. On what does a part of society base its emotions? On the visual reception of candidates shown on television. On the one hand, there was a reputable, however annoying candidate, someone well-known yet boastful. And on the other, there was an attractive orator, a master of sophistry. The topic of the future and the past is important

for crowds, not politicians. People under 30 hardly remember communism, which thus does not evoke fear. The young do not feel hurt by communism, given that in past years the sense of national continuity and national upbringing was paralyzed.

An average Pole has been waiting for a statesman-president to arrive. Mr. Kwasniewski fits that idealistic image better because he has an attractive personality, is a good speaker, is cool and restrained, knows international habits, and speaks foreign languages. However, a statesman also means a political program, which is hard to assess during election campaigns, given that slogans are offered, such as "We will not retreat from the path of reform," "We will care for pensioners," or "Choose the future." Those kinds of truisms are not enough to be a statesman.

[KAI] What is your opinion about the role of the religious factor in the election, that of religious feelings? Many Catholics voted for Aleksander Kwasniewski, did they not?

[Glemp] The division of society into leftists and rightists is not correct and neither are other kinds of division that pretend to include all the Poles in one of the two actually existing groups. [passage omitted]

The election of Mr. Kwasniewski to the presidential post strengthened the group of neopagans or "laymen." There is no doubt that this is an antichurch and anticlerical formation, inherited by the Socialist Left Alliance [SLD] from the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR]. This is probably the most durable element of that heritage. The inherited animosity toward the church has its doctrine, and hence its limits. It is hardly ever shown in emotions. I would say that only certain ladies have permission to display it.

[KAI] Catholics and not only they ask the same question: Is the outcome of the election a defeat for the church? Did the church not lose by placing its entire authority on scales and supporting Lech Walesa so openly?

[Glemp] First of all, the church commended Lech Walesa to prayers. Every prayer means relying on God's mercy. God either listens to a request or not because he has his own plans and intentions. If certain priests engaged very emotionally [in the election campaign], which was not the episcopate's intention, they might have evoked a contrary reaction. In this respect, religion was not the decisive factor in people's choice. The point is that freedom gives people the opportunity to choose what they like. The subjective nature of distinguishing between good and evil played its role here. People chose what the majority liked. [as published] On the other hand, their choice was also prompted by weariness

with the current system, socioeconomic conditions, and the anticipation of a magical improvement in those conditions, particularly the feeling of security. Therefore, speaking about the church's defeat is not quite correct. We can only say that the church prayed for a choice, pointing at Mr. Walesa as a representative of Christianity.[passage omitted]

[KAI] How do you envision future relations with President Kwasniewski and his political camp, whose statements about the church's role do not necessarily give grounds for optimism?

[Glomp] The attitude toward the Catholic Church should not be measured by postelection statements. It should be measured broadly, particularly by statements made before elections. Animosity toward the church on the part of the SLD and the PZPR is not unanimous. However, there will always be attempts to undermine religious feelings in society, given that living religion is the source of the church hierarchy's strength. The undermining of the religion's foundations in PZPR times was made by exerting administrative pressure under the conditions of the party's omnipotence. In SLD times it is being achieved by mockery and ridicule, including by the strong and rich center created by Mr. Jerzy Urban, former PRL [Polish People's Republic] government spokesman. By openly surrounding himself with people such as Mr. Urban, Ms. Waniek, Ms. Labuda, and Mr. Szmajdzinski, whose main trait is animosity toward the church, Mr. Kwasniewski reveals his presidential policy. I have here in my hand a statement by Mr. Szmajdzinski published in GAZETA POZNANSKA on 17 March 1995, in which, using the language of Gomulka [former PZPR first secretary], he criticizes the primate. That kind of mentality has not changed because there were either no conditions to change it or no will to accomplish that. Changes have occurred in the attitude toward collectivization, but not toward outlook.

Is there a chance for a dialogue between the state and the church when the authorities' monism is growing? There will definitely be talks, given that there are certain structures empowered to hold them. Talks should be conducted, even if there are prejudices and lack of trust. The preceding talks, for instance on the Concordat, resembled the thrashing of chaff. If someone is strong he can neglect his counterpart in a very polite form. I am aware that the first urge of the reinstated power will be that of dividing clergymen into open-minded, progressive ones, and conservatives or even fundamentalists.

For the Catholics, the election of Mr. Kwasniewski is an appeal for better observance of God's commandments

and God's will. God says: "My thoughts are not your thoughts." We should deepen our faith and revive the acts of love.

[KAI] What will be the church's attitude toward the new president? Will it be a cautious dialogue, the observation of Aleksander Kwasniewski's moves, or a more aggressive course with regard to the president representing the SLD?

[Glomp] I believe that we will make certain decisions at the episcopate to determine the church's stance—not as much for the new reality, but with regard to the new tinge that the future president will add to that reality. Of course, we will not suggest any revolt. However, I believe that the church's stance also is unambiguous with regard to national aspirations, provided the latter are able to manifest themselves. I do not think that we, as the church, will undertake any kind of political leadership again. Instead, we will very closely observe everything happening in the political arena. The questions of faith and the national tradition of that faith, whose roots go back more than a millennium, remain very important to us. Therefore, we will not start from scratch, as certain people would currently like to suggest.

Reaction in Army to Presidential Elections

WS0512131195 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 28 Nov 95 p 4

[Article by Zbigniew Lentowicz: "By Voting 'For,' Servicemen Were Rather 'Against'; the Army Is Lying in Wait"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *The zeal and haste with which Defense Minister Zbigniew Wojciech Okonski relinquished his office on election night did not make the best of impressions on the Army. Personal considerations and short-term politics have once more proved to be more important than state defense, claim embittered servicemen, adding that this further saps their faith in the civilian decisionmakers within the Ministry of National Defense [MON]. And it was not strong to begin with.*

Generally speaking, military commanders are avoiding making any comments on current developments. Heads of departments at MON are not giving interviews. [Chief of General Staff] General Tadeusz Wilecki has even called off his visit to the Poznan tankers he is so fond of and to whom he was to hand over a banner at the local academy for higher officers. He remained posted at the General Staff and is now curing minor ailments [in hospital]. "These are not wounds sustained in the election campaign," we were assured. Although General

Staff Spokesman Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda claims "nothing of greater significance is going on within the Army," that things are running as usual, and that the Army is never without a commander, one can clearly see that the result of the elections has sent shockwaves through the chief commanders who took refuge in their trenches: They are awaiting new faces at the top and new orders.

Judgmental Votes

The cadres that are the backbone of an institution as old as the world itself do not like abrupt changes. Conservatism and adaptability are important elements of the internal hierarchy system.

The shock is particularly severe because the Army, undemocratic by its very nature and operating on the principle of discipline and orders, rarely has such extremes to choose from. In the privacy of the curtained voting booth, every officer, warrant officer, or sergeant could vote honestly, without any constraints. Some experts on the military claim that this was a unique opportunity for the soldiers to voice their own opinions on a major issue. Even speeches delivered at officers' meetings or any other military self-government forum are not free from external influence.

As analyses show, Aleksander Kwasniewski won by a staggering majority in districts where military cadres voted in huge numbers. Closed voting stations were not established within the military units; the soldiers left the garrisons and voted in "civilian" stations. Election results in Rembertow, the "militarized" Zagan, or Mirosławiec, however, did nothing to change the fact that Lech Walesa, chief commander of the Armed Forces, had distinctly less support among servicemen.

There are many reasons for this, and they are not all due to cheerful memories of the Polish People's Republic or the virtues of Kwasniewski himself. However, for some, these may have been the arguments that tipped the balance.

Walesa To Blame for Restructuring

By crossing out Walesa's name, the officers deemed the president partly responsible for the sacrifices that practically every soldier was forced to make in recent years. Over the past five years, the Army was reduced by more than 40 percent, and outlays on the military fell by 60 percent. Practically not a single military unit avoided restructuring. This enigmatic term unequivocally stands for the painful process of garrison shutdowns, staffing cuts, and—quite often—final orders to pack bags and move with entire families and life possessions to the other end of the country. The 27,000 officers in the

peak of their professional activity who chose to go on to the reserve forces and remain at their garrisons are still looking for an answer of what to do with the rest of their lives. Anyone who is aware of the individual, human costs and the scale of restructuring must feel astonished by the discipline and lack of outspoken protests from the military community. [passage omitted]

Wilecki and Opponents

Did the servicemen express their distrust of the chief commanders by casting their votes for Kwasniewski? Deputies from the victorious leftist camp are inclined to think so. After all, it is hardly a secret where the sympathies of the chief of the General Staff and several of his subordinates lay, they point out. "I am a man of politics," Gen. Wilecki stressed in public, dispelling the doubts anyone might have had. The opposition emphasizes that, by scheming and playing his own game with the particular power centers, Wilecki enlarged his own empire and attempted to gain more autonomy for the Armed Forces. One could speculate to no end as to whether the way the garrisons voted undermined the authority of the top soldier in the Polish Armed Forces. For someone who is associated with the painful consequences of restructuring, coupled with the low military budget, Gen. Wilecki, surrounded as he is by opponents attacking him for awarding himself rings, benefiting from presidential bonuses, and lacking political restraint, continues to be greatly admired and respected by his subordinates. The political players have to take that into account.

Leader in UW Expelled; Split Possible

WS0412153295 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 4 Dec 95 p 2

[Article by Ma.S. and K.O.: "On Leszek Balcerowicz's Motion; Rokita Removed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *On the motion of Freedom Union [UW] Chairman Leszek Balcerowicz, the party's National Council at its 3 December session (which was closed to the press) expelled Jan Maria Rokita from the presidium for disloyalty to the party and for not making an unequivocal declaration of support for Jacek Kuron in the elections. The motion was accepted with a margin of seven votes. The council did not agree to a proposal made by the politicians of the former Liberal-Democratic Congress; they proposed that an extraordinary platform congress be held in two months' time. (During such a congress, the leadership of the party might be changed).*

The official justification of the motion submitted by Chairman Balcerowicz was that Rokita breached the

party members' conduct code, which was approved last April. It reads that "ideological and political opinions voiced in public by members of the leadership must not contradict UW's platform and policies."

The motion submitted by the UW chairman outraged the party's right-wing faction, which says that it is impossible to expel one of the leading politicians of this faction of the party and, at the same time, declare openness to the right.

Former UW Chairman Tadeusz Mazowiecki made a statement in which he criticized Balcerowicz's idea—he admitted that Rokita is not perfect, but he is one of the best UW politicians, which he proved when he was one of the chief ministers in the Suchocka cabinet. He added that UW would now have three options: It can become a minor centrist, tip-of-the-scale party; it can be a group bridging "historical gaps"; or it can take part in the formation of a broad camp of post-Solidarity forces. Mazowiecki most strongly supports the third option.

UW Deputy Chairman Tadeusz Syryjczyk suggested early at the council's session that no personnel motions be put to the vote, but his proposal was voted down by a small margin.

In interviews with journalists, Hanna Suchocka, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and Bronislaw Komorowski criticized Rokita's expulsion. Asked whether UW might split, they gave equivocal answers but made it clear that this would certainly not happen in the immediate future.

The former prime minister confirmed that she had rejected the offer submitted by Balcerowicz, who wanted her to replace Rokita in the presidium. She told journalists that "this is a practical implementation of the *divide et impera* (divide and rule) principle." Hanna Suchocka was outraged by the fact that, shortly after Kwasniewski's electoral victory, UW expelled from the party's leadership a person who made the greatest effort to prevent the victory of the postcommunist candidate.

Bronislaw Komorowski stated that it is disturbing that this expulsion will be unfavorably received in the right-wing parties to which UW wants to open up. He resigned his membership in the presidium. Some of the UW politicians accused Komorowski of engaging in the "Three-Fourths Initiative" and taking photos of himself when lists of support for Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz were being signed.

Jan Maria Rokita, even before the voting was held, admitted to one mistake: that he had been unable to "stay tight-lipped" in front of journalists. However, as he explained to UW politicians, he always believed that, if a journalist asks a politician a question, he should

provide an answer; now he believes that this approach was a mistake—he should not have told them anything.

Before that, Leszek Balcerowicz suggested that, unless the National Council expelled Rokita from the presidium, he would resign as chairman because he does not want to run such an undisciplined group.

At a news conference, Balcerowicz stated that Rokita was expelled because lack of discipline, disloyalty, and Labuda-zation [reference to UW Deputy Barbara Labuda, who was disloyal to the party and expelled from it] must not be tolerated. He gave assurances that Rokita would still remain an "important deputy" in UW.

Balcerowicz announced a month ago, during the previous session of the UW Council, that he would submit a motion requesting the expulsion of Rokita from the highest UW leadership. From that moment until 3 December, negotiations were under way to dissuade Balcerowicz from submitting such a motion. Such talks were also held during yesterday's session. If most of the broad leadership had voted against Rokita's expulsion, Balcerowicz would most probably have resigned. The expulsion of Rokita may mark the beginning of a split within the party; its right-liberal faction may break off—if not immediately, then fairly soon.

Patriotic Camp To Become Political Party

LD0412134695 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1300 GMT 4 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Patriotic Camp, composed of eight parties that supported Lech Walesa in the presidential elections, has decided to become a federated political party. It includes the Non-party Bloc in Support of Reform, the Confederation for an Independent Poland, the Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Alliance, the Movement for the Republic, and the Republicans.

The members of the Patriotic Camp are aiming for political victory in the parliamentary elections. They announce that after the victory they will bring Aleksander Kwasniewski before the state tribunal.

Aviation Sit-In May Spark Arms Industry Strike

WS0512132095 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 5 Dec 95 p 1

[Report by "PW, MD, JS" in Rzeszow: "Will the Entire Arms Industry Come to a Standstill? Sit-In in Mielec"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A sit-in began yesterday at the Mielec Transportation Equipment Plant-Polish Aviation Plant. The reason is a statement issued by the Ministry of National Defense [MON] saying that it will not purchase Iryda trainer aircraft. Solidarity does not rule

out that strikes may spread throughout the entire arms industry.

Some 40 workers occupied the administration building at 0700. Flags were hung out at the gate. Production, however, was not stopped. All trade unions have voiced their support for the strike.

The protest is the result of an announcement made by MON that it is planning to purchase Alpha-Jet trainer aircraft in Germany instead of the domestic Iryda planes of a similar class.

"The government's decision may cause thousands of people to lose their jobs," we read in a statement issued by the strikers' committee.

"The Iryda case is a spark that might become a fire," Stanislaw Glowacki, chief of the Arms Industry Solidarity, told GAZETA WYBORCZA. "One year ago, the government promised it would give more money for equipment orders. Now it turns out that only 13 out of 31 plants will not lie idle."

Accord With U.S. on Military Secrets Ratified

*AU0512085995 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 1700 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Chamber of Deputies today passed the draft law on the ratification of the accord between the Governments of Romania and the United States on measures to protect military state secrets. The deputies also approved the reports of several mediating committees. [passage omitted]

Ministry: Ships Carried 'Clandestine' Nuclear Fuel

*AU0412191095 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 1700 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Romanian Ministry of Waters, Forests, and Environment Protection has issued a new press communique in connection with the 30 November 1995 seizure in Romanian territorial waters of Bulgarian vessels transporting containers with nuclear fuel en route from Reni, Ukraine to Kozloduy, Bulgaria.

Among other things, the communique points out that the transiting of radioactive material was signalled to the Shipping Transportation Department of that ministry, as it was found that the cargo seized was clandestine, that the genuine contents of the cargo having not been declared, and that both Romanian and international legal stipulations had been violated.

The press communique then enumerates these stipulations, adding, that to observe legality and to allow the two vessels to continue their voyage, on the basis of good relations with Bulgaria, the Romanian authorities will, after they are given the necessary technical information, grant authorization to proceed with the shipment having a special cargo status.

At the same time, the communique warns that in the future the Romanian authorities should be informed at least seven days in advance about such transportations, as stipulated by all the documents in domestic legislation, as well as in the international conventions to which both Romania and Bulgaria are signatories.

Melescanu Comments on Snakes Island Dispute

*AU0512110295 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 0500 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] In negotiating the dispute over Snakes Island [Insula Serpilor] within the framework of the basic treaty with Ukraine, Romania has a very well-prepared file and good arguments in its favor. It is prepared to resolve the dispute either during negotiations or, if no mutually acceptable solution is found, by submitting the matter to international

forums, including the International Court of Justice. This was mentioned during the negotiations, [Foreign Minister] Teodor Melescanu said yesterday answering a parliamentary interpellation in the Senate.

The head of Romania's diplomacy explained that although Snakes Island has no economic value as such, it could acquire significance through its quite important oil and gas reserves. Also, the issue is significant because of the difficulties it could cause in delineating the territorial waters of the continental plateau and economic zone between Romania and Ukraine.

Daily Views Victory of PDSR 'Reformist' Wing

*AU0412191195 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI
in Romanian 27, 28, 29 Nov 95*

[Editorial in three installments by Ion Cristoiu: "Ion Iliescu's Contribution to Adrian Nastase's Victory"]

[27 Nov p 1]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt]

The President Intervenes Decisively at the Last Moment

The dozing on the last day [25 November] of the National Conference of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] was disturbed by a surprising event. When least expected by those present in the hall, Presidential Adviser Gheorghe Fulga took the floor and read a message from Ion Iliescu to the participants. On the previous, opening day of the conference [24 November], the national meeting of the ruling party listened to the president's official message read by the same Gheorghe Fulga. The message read out on Saturday, 25 November, was meant to be a supplement to the initial one. Through his envoy, the president said that if he decides to run in the next elections, he will only run under the PDSR's banner. This unusual intervention was motivated by the need to put an end to certain "speculations" made during the National Conference regarding the relations between the PDSR and Ion Iliescu. Although the text of the message avoided any concrete references and contained only hints, things became quite clear both for those in the hall and for those who watched the conference proceedings. In his vehement speech against corruption within the PDSR, Dan Martian [PDSR vice president and deputy speaker of the Chamber of Deputies] let it be understood from the conference rostrum that Ion Iliescu is hesitating to accept the PDSR proposal to run on that party's behalf, because he is dissatisfied with the involvement of that government party in many dubious affairs. The party's vice president corroborated

his hypothesis by claiming that, when asked to accept the PDSR's candidature, the president had given an evasive reply. Invoking Ion Iliescu's ambiguous answer, Martian tried to use the incontestable popularity enjoyed by the president among the PDSR members in order to influence the elections for the supreme functions within the PDSR to the benefit of his grouping. This maneuver had serious chances of success, given the fact that the president's answer to the request of the PDSR Standing Delegation might have been interpreted as a dissociation from Adrian Nastase's [executive PDSR president and speaker of the Chamber of Deputies] team, not only by the political analysis, but also by some of the participants in the conference. Through his second message, Iliescu clarified the situation. His refusal to allow them to nominate him as PDSR's presidential candidate should not be interpreted as a signal of his discontent with the party's leadership, which is assured by Oliviu Gherman [PDSR president and Senate president] and Adrian Nastase. Simply, Ion Iliescu considered that the time is not yet ripe to announce his intention to run in the next presidential elections. [passage omitted]

President Iliescu's gesture in sending a corrected message, with an addendum, to such an important meeting is of profound significance. The PDSR National Conference opened under the sign of a silent struggle between Adrian Nastase's and Dan Martian's groups. In the period leading up to the meeting, the two groups became involved in a fiery battle for power in the party, a battle carried out mainly in the press. The only one capable of tilting the balance one way or the other was Ion Iliescu, the PDSR's incontestable leader. [passage omitted] At one point, the balance seemed to tilt in Martian's favor, because, on quite a few occasions, Iliescu had expressed his discontent with the prevailing corruption within the PDSR. By announcing, in his second message, that he will run only under the PDSR's sign, the president decided the battle in favor of Nastase's group.

[28 Nov p 1]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt]

The PDSR's Change of Face

Therefore, Ion Iliescu threw his lot with Adrian Nastase's group, to the detriment of Dan Martian's group. [passage omitted] Martian is considered not only internally, but also outside the party, as a representative of the conservative trend within the PDSR. On the other hand, Iliescu has recently been engaged in a tough battle to convince the public opinion at home and abroad that he has chosen, once and for all, the path of reform and Romania's integration into the euro-atlantic struc-

tures. His visits to the United States, his statements after the meeting with Bill Clinton, but particularly his break with the Greater Romania Party [PRM] and, in perspective, with the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM], have succeeded in creating—both in Romania and in the Western chanceries—the image of a politician who has definitely broken with his communist past. Compared with Dan Martian, Adrian Nastase is considered as the representative of the reformist and pro-Western trend in the ruling party. Although choosing to back Martian would have had its advantages in the battle with the nationalist-communist left, it would have made Iliescu appear as Nastase's adversary. This would have reflected negatively on the relations with the United States and the West, which might have seen in his dissociation from Adrian Nastase a signal of Iliescu's return to the neo-communism he has been accused of for so long. On the other hand, the entire conference was marked by the effort to project the PDSR as a modern and pro-Western party, rivaling the right-wing opposition parties in terms of image.

There are many things that support that. The presidential message, the meeting's documents, and the speeches made at the National Conference were dominated by the obsessive concern with dissociating themselves from the internal life characteristics of the PRM, the PSM, and the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR]. Messianic speeches like the ones made by Corneliu Vadim Tudor [PRM president], excessive patriotic manifestations like the ones in the PUNR National Convention, or the pseudomorality typical of the PSM were avoided. At previous PDSR meetings, the PDSR adversaries criticized the nationalist and communist ideas in the speeches and documents made on those occasions. It is interesting to note that, this time, no such reproaches were made. Aside from justified remonstrations with the cockiness displayed there, a conceit characteristic of the sole party concept, even the most ardent opponents of the PDSR could not attack the latest conference for its would-be leftist stridence. [passage omitted]

[29 Nov p 1]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt]

The Clever Presidential Calculation

In throwing his lot with Adrian Nastase, the president also took into consideration the fact that Dan Martian's position is in a minority within the PDSR. For a number of reasons, which I will not enumerate here, today's ruling party is no longer the same one as in September 1992. In the past three years of government, the PDSR has gradually changed its electoral message. It no longer addresses itself to the "many and poor," so to say, that

is the ones who voted for it in September 1992, but to a slowly-but-surely-growing category, that is, the middle class. The party's slow movement to the right has firmly placed the PDSR in the center of our political landscape. [passage omitted] All the correspondents present at the recently concluded National Conference agreed that the image offered by the delegates differed fundamentally from the image offered by the initial national reunion. One can say, without fear of being wrong, that, step by step, the PDSR led by Nastase has returned to the reformism, prosperity, and modernism of the Petre Roman group in the initial National Salvation Front [FSN], which, at the time of the divorce from Ion Iliescu's party, was accused of having moved to the right. If the president had categorically chosen to back Martian's group last Thursday, this would have led to a split in the PDSR during the National Conference. From Iliescu's viewpoint, this would have been a deadly danger. As could be seen from the unfolding of the conference, the PDSR leaders tried hard, at Iliescu's prodding, to present the ruling party as the most solid, united, and strongest political force in Romania. [passage omitted]

It is therefore clear that Ion Iliescu has opted for Nastase's group as of Thursday night. Why then did he not accept the proposal of the Standing Delegation to be nominated, on the second day of the National Conference, as the party's presidential candidate? For a simple reason, which the PDSR leaders have surprisingly failed to realize. If Ion Iliescu had accepted the proposal, then the entire National Conference would have proceeded under the sign of the Iliescu cult, in a damaging pseudofestive atmosphere. [passage omitted] From a meeting of a modern European party, the National Conference would have degenerated into a Romanian Communist Party [RCP] Congress, typical of the last years of Ceausescu's rule! By refusing the proposal of the Standing Committee, Iliescu enabled the PDSR National Conference to proceed in a normal atmosphere. Moreover, by giving an ambiguous answer, the president created a context for the summit of the ruling party to give the impression of a democratic clash of viewpoints. Willy-nilly, through his entire behavior, Dan Martian made the president's play, by giving the PDSR National Conference the ambience of a meeting that has nothing to do with the festive and pseudosolemn practices of the former RCP. Under the same token, Ion Iliescu deemed it necessary to end the ambiguity on Saturday afternoon, shortly before the PDSR National Council was going to elect the executive and honorary party presidents. [passage omitted] By this, he confirmed his backing for Adrian Nastase's group. The consequences of this act is already known. Adrian Nastase and Oliviu Gherman were elected unanimously at the head of the party. A

question mark regarding another prominent member of the Nastase group, Miron Mitrea [former leader of the Fratia trade union], was also clarified: He was elected the party's general secretary. The conference proceedings thus marked a crushing victory for the Nastase group. In view of the fact that corruption will undoubtedly be a central theme of the future electoral campaign for Adrian Nastase and Ion Iliescu, difficulties still lie ahead of them. As for Dan Martian, I believe that he will have to choose between staying on in the party and reining in his Robespierre-like pathos or leaving the PDSR for another political grouping or for a party of his own, situated to the left of the current ruling party.

CDR President To Join PNTCD, Run for Senate

AU0512094695 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 5 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At an extraordinary meeting yesterday, the Executive Committee of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] established a assessment scale for candidates who will run in local and legislative elections. The assessment embraces such matters as morality, correctness, professional competence, and organizational and leadership skills. The candidates will also be required to fill out a blank resignation form.

Our correspondent also informs us that at a meeting with journalists CDR President Emil Constantinescu announced his decision to become a member of the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] and to run for the position of senator on the lists of that political formation.

During the PNTCD's weekly news conference yesterday, party leader Ion Diaconescu said that if Emil Constantinescu becomes president of Romania, he will give up the formal pledge that he is going to sign to become member of the aforementioned political formation.

PDSR VP: PNTCD Members Support Iron Guard

AU0412195795 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 29 Nov 95 p 2

[MEDIAFAX report: "Ion Solcanu Accuses Some PNTCD Leaders of Reviving the Iron Guard Movement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ion Solcanu, PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] vice president, has accused a part of the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] leadership of encouraging the revival of the Iron Guard [World War II fascist] phenomenon and the Iron Guard movement. On Tuesday, 27 November, during a news conference, Solcanu accused Lucia Hossu-Longin, the producer of the "Memorial of Pain"

[television series] of showing propaganda on the national television station for the Iron Guard movement in a program devoted to anticommunist resistance in the Fagarasi Mountains. "We are worried about the revival of right-wing extremism. I was greatly shocked by this propaganda shown on the national television channel," said Ion Solcanu. Asked to specify the PNTCD leaders who support the Iron Guard movement, Solcanu refused to give names. "They know who they are. Some of them were even important members of that movement," Solcanu said in conclusion.

Hurdubaie New Head of National Interpol Bureau

*AU0412175195 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian
28 Nov 95 p 1*

[Luiza Cristina report: "Colonel Ioan Hurdubaie Is the New Chief of the National Interpol Bureau"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Through an order signed yesterday, 27 November, by the Minister of Interior, Colonel

Ioan Hurdubaie was appointed to the position of head of the National Interpol Bureau. Col. Hurdubaie is replacing Col. Vasile Troneci, who has recently been placed in reserves. Ioan Hurdubaie was born on 1 February 1947 in the commune of Tanacu, Vaslui County. He graduated from Mihai Kogalniceanu High School in his home town. In 1971 Hurdubaie graduated from Bucharest Law School and graduated in 1983 with high honors from the postuniversity courses of the same higher education institution. Currently he is completing his Ph.D. at the Alexandru Ioan Cuza Police Academy. Col. Hurdubaie is general secretary of the Romanian Criminology and Crime Studies Society. He has been trained in France and Switzerland. In his capacity as crime expert he has worked with the Bucharest Police and the General Police Inspectorate. He has been working with the National Interpol Bureau since 1 April 1977.

Ioan Hurdubaie is married and has two daughters who are also studying law. Hurdubaie speaks six languages.

Federal

TANJUG Comments on Changed Slovene FRY Stance

*LD0312145495 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1430 GMT 3 Nov 95*

[Report by Igor Saranovic: "Slovenia's Sudden Change of Tack Towards Yugoslavia"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ljubljana, Dec 3 (TANJUG) — Slovenia again surprised the international and confused its own public opinion with its unexpected recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and its statement that FRY conducted a truly peaceful policy.

Slovenia's strategic, political and economic interests led it to adopt its new stand towards Belgrade, to which it had for years shown national and political animosity, and which it had done its utmost to discredit with the international community.

Slovenian diplomats explained their decision to recognise Yugoslavia with the fact that after the Dayton accord on Bosnia the international community radically improved its stand towards the federation of Serbia and Montenegro.

The abrupt change of Slovenia's stand towards Yugoslavia - from pronounced animosity to full normalisation of relations - is explained by Slovenian Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler as Ljubljana's attempt to avoid the 'recognition package' that all states formed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia are expected to accept at the Paris meeting in mid-December.

The Slovenian leadership is trying to soften the justified lack of affection felt for Slovenia by the majority of Serbs and Montenegrins whom it persistently demonised with the all-out support of Slovenian media.

The messages of reconciliation that Slovenia is so loudly sending to Belgrade are more a result of the rapid changes of the situation in the former Yugoslavia and the realization of leading political centers that FRY, the continuation of the former Yugoslavia, is a very important factor of peace and stability in the entire region, than of Ljubljana leadership's decision to acknowledge its mistaken strategy so far.

The present Slovenian leadership, headed by President Milan Kucan, which had until recently called for indirect military force to be imposed on Yugoslavia in addition to the political-economic restrictions, has in now way changed the essence of its traditional, hard-core anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav position.

Slovenia's haste to recognise the successor of the former Yugoslavia before all its ex-republics is at the same time

an attempt to seize the last chance to keep at least a morcel of the economic market in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro.

Before secession Slovenia's exports to the area stood at some three billion dollars while the present trade volume, mostly conducted via Macedonia, is only seven million dollars.

Bank Head Briefs Press on New Economic Program

*LD0512113895 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1029 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 5 (TANJUG) — Governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia (Central Bank) Dragoslav Avramovic has said that Yugoslavia needs foreign capital because it does not have its own funds for huge investment needs. Speaking at a press conference in Belgrade on Monday, Avramovic said that Yugoslavia would not stand a chance in competition for foreign capital unless it offered better or at least the same conditions as other countries.

Avramovic, the architect of the new economic programme adopted by the Yugoslav government in November, said that the first impressions about its implementation were good, as the exchange rate of the national currency, the dinar, was stable and interest rates had dropped. The programme envisages import liberalization, convertibility of the dinar (one German mark trades for 3.3 dinars), speedy privatization and a series of other measures to spur on the Yugoslav economy.

Avramovic said that a surprisingly large number of producers, who had even had privileges because of an unrealistic exchange rate, had accepted new measures. According to him, this indicates big export possibilities of the Yugoslav economy. 'There has even been no opposition to the new measures, which I have expected from companies affected by the liberalization of import,' Avramovic said.

He added that the number of economists opposing this programme was far smaller than in the case of the 1994 national currency restoration programme.

Reporters asked whether Avramovic, who is scheduled to visit Paris on December 12 and meet with the French Central Bank governor, would use the visit also for meetings at the so-called Paris Club that rallies creditor states. Avramovic replied that contacts at the Paris Club and other international organizations and institutions were not planned until things at home were settled, primarily those linked with the implementation of the programme, including the issue of privatization.

Draft Budget Includes Increased Army Expenditure*LD0412182595 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1402 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 4 Dec (TANJUG) — The Federal Government today passed on to the deputies of the Yugoslav Assembly the law on changes and additions to the federal budget law, which envisages an increase of 450 million dinars to federal expenditure for 1995.

The Federation's total budget expenditure for this year would thus rise to 2.578 billion dinars. [passage omitted]

The suggested increase of 450 million dinars would be allocated primarily to the Yugoslav Army, which would be given around 245 million dinars, and 160 million dinars for the care for invalids and veterans, which — according to the Government's explanation — should be provided from already existing sources of revenue. [passage omitted]

Greek Envoy on 'New Age' in Economic Cooperation*LD0112215895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2022 GMT 1 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 1 (TANJUG) — The Yugoslav economy has despite sanctions-invited difficulties managed to preserve vital facilities and could, without delay, join economic cooperation with other countries.

Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce President Mihailo Milojevic set out in conference with an economic delegation of the Greek city Larissa on Friday that 'the Greek people and state had understanding for our (Yugoslav) difficulties over the past three and a half years (under sanctions) and we will surely know to appreciate this in future relations.'

The representative of the Greek Government in the region of Thessaly, which offers high opportunities for establishing business ties in all economic branches, Vassilis Exarchos, who heads the delegation, said the arrival of Greek businessmen, just a few days after sanctions' suspension, was further proof of friendship and the wish to restore peace in the Balkans.

He emphasized that the 'presence of the 30-strong delegation of Thessaly opens a new age in economic cooperation between the two countries.'

The Greek economy representatives are to tour the 'Prehrana 95' fair, which opened in Belgrade on Friday so that they could, as Exarchos said, gain insight into the possibilities for economic cooperation, not only in

the area of food industry but also in the metal, wood and timber and agricultural industries.

Serbia**Article Examines Reasons for 'Big' SPS 'Purge'***AU0512090895 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Dec 95 pp 1, 9*

[Report by Bahri Cani: "Big Cadre Purge in SPS"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade — The new policy of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic no longer tolerates war speak nor those who used it in the past or those who might remember that the president, too, joined them in saying that all Serbs should live in one state. It has transpired that there is no alternative to peace, especially after the suspension of the sanctions. This, of course, does not mean that all those in any way dissatisfied with the post-Dayton orientation of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] do not have an alternative (a replacement). [passage omitted]

The rumors about the alleged "hit list," which was first mentioned on the occasion of the recent ousting of the Politika enterprise director, Zivorad Minovic, are coming true. The list, which was supposedly compiled by the leadership of a non-parliamentary political association, features, apart from Minovic, the people who were told goodbye on Wednesday. However, the circles close to the Socialists judge that the hunting down of "the rogues" among their ranks is not over yet.

The fact that Secretary General Milomir Minic was only appointed "the technical man" in the organizing committee for the preparation of the party congress implies that he will soon be told "thank you," too. It is believed that Mihajlo Kertes and, as some most daring speculations say, even the untouchable Radmilo Bogdanovic will have to leave their posts....

The least controversial of the earlier planned cadre purges was that of Academician Markovic, one of the authors of the SPS's program, its founder, "chief ideologist," and the creator of the party's national policy.... His biggest sins were a public media debate (the state media did not publish his replies) with a lady of the same surname, Mrs. Mirjana Markovic [director of the Yugoslav Left and Milosevic's wife] and an open disagreement with the national policy of the SPS (he made the most noise at the session of the main committee in August) and President Milosevic, which, as we were told, was best reflected in Markovic's proposal that the Yugoslav Army should take part in the fighting during the Croatian Army attack on Krajina.

Borisav Jovic did not wish to comment for NASA BORBA on the decision about his replacement "until

all the details are known" and he suggested that we call him after a week. We can deduce from this that the hitherto leaders were actually "tried in absentia."

The former candidate for the Yugoslav prime minister (he lost to Ante Markovic), the chief of the collective SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] leadership (during the crucial power struggle in Serbia), the right hand man of President Milosevic, although encountering some minor sidetracking, has held on almost until the very last moment.

Until recently, he has even made several important visits abroad (as the president of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Federal Assembly — he still holds the post). The fact that Jovic took part in all the prior cadre and other upheavals in Serbia only proves that he knows a lot, perhaps even too much, and that he could (ab)use this in a given moment. The circles close to the SPS leadership claim that Milosevic was not very happy with the publication of the diary notes by the former SFRY president, collected in a book entitled "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia."

After being ousted from the posts of the director of Radio and Television Serbia and the chief of the Socialists' club of deputies in the republican parliament, it was only a matter of time before Milorad Vucelic would be officially separated from his remaining party functions, and perhaps even from the party. According to some forecasts, he will not escape responsibility for the alleged financial machinations that occurred while he was director of Radio and Television Serbia.

It is said that Radovan Pankov had to pay the price for being close to Vucelic (at the session of the republican government he was one of the fiercest opponents of Vucelic being replaced as the director of Radio and Television Serbia). Reportedly, Pankov "earned" the "transfer" from the current post with his open support for Markovic's proposal that the Yugoslav Army should become actively involved in the defense of the Krajina Serbs.

The chief of Belgrade Socialists, Slobodan Jovanovic, "blew it" in the direct squabbles that recently broke out "on the southern railroad" with Dragan Tomic, minister coordinator in the republican government and director of Simpo. The sympathies that the president of the Yugoslav Left had for Tomic (expressed in her diary in DUGA) were a clear indication of with whom "the justice" will side in the resolution of "the southern conflicts" about power. Jovanovic was also by no means forgiven for the belligerence of POLITIKA EKSPRES during the time he was its editor.

According to the NIN sources, Jovanovic has nevertheless not lost the trust of President Milosevic entirely, but was merely "moved" because it was assessed that the opposition leaders in Belgrade should be faced with somebody who could parry the likes of Djindjic and Kostunica with more dignity.

Some sources close to the SPS claim that President Milosevic decided to flush the original Socialists (the former hardened communists) down the drain as a result of the triumph of some other forces ("more modern" communists), which is difficult to believe. It is certain, though, that the major cadre changes were carried out in the SPS leadership prior to the elections. President Milosevic, who did not manage to secure (the desired) parliamentary majority at the last elections, could use the people who did not "soil their hands" to finally get a parliament "the citizens will be proud of" after "the evident" increase in the country's popularity. If not at the early elections, then at the regular elections that will be held next December.

[Box, p 9]

New Forces

Zoran Lilic, the newly elected leader of the SPS main committee, is currently FRY president and used to be the speaker of the Serbian Assembly, the director of Rekord.... Cynics say that his greatest political achievement is perhaps "not meddling in his affairs." Nikola Sainovic is currently a deputy federal prime minister. Among his earlier merits were heading the republican government and the Energy Ministry....

Before "the unexpected" appointment as the chief of the Yugoslav diplomacy, Milan Milutinovic was the ambassador in Athens. Some claim that his biggest success was that he has long socialized with Milosevic. As for Mirko Marjanovic, it perhaps suffices to say that he accepted the post of prime minister in the crucial time of implementation of Avramovic's program when he was expected to curb the hyperinflation. Otherwise, Marjanovic continues to be the director of Progres. Following the replacement of Milorad Vucelic, Novi Pazar Judge Gorica Gajovic was promoted to the chief of the Socialists' club of deputies in the republican parliament. She is a deputy in the republican assembly and "happily divorced."

Youngish Bosko Perošević is currently the president of the provincial government in Vojvodina and the party vice president. Branislav Ivković, a father of four children, is a minister and has lately been busy providing accommodation for the refugees.

[Box, p 9]

Hasty Blow to the Leadership

With the exception of the eighth session [of the Serbian Communists], when a vast majority of the present Socialists were still members of a different party, the Wednesday session was the biggest purge in the ranks of the ruling party so far. Two party presidents and a handful of leading party members evidently do not pose a problem for President Milosevic. After Dayton and following an evident increase in the president's popularity, we can expect that this blow will only be the first in a series.

A counterattack by the undesirables could, perhaps, be expected after some time. The rumors about the supposed formation of a new party whose leadership would consist of Dobrica Cosic, Mihajlo Markovic, Borisav Jovic, Brana Crncevic, and Milorad Vucelic, have already started to circulate....

Public 'Skeptical' About Post-Sanctions Economy

AU0512093795 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
30 Nov 95 pp 1, 10

[Report from Belgrade by Cristian Mihai Chis: "Confusion Among the Gasoline Smugglers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The suspension of sanctions has disturbed the gasoline smugglers on both banks of the Danube River. But is has not shocked them. With a good feeling of how to seize every opportunity, which has made many of them rich, they are now rearranging their lines. Currently in the Danube straights, as well as in the corresponding Serbian geographical area, the Kladovo-Golubac area, they have begun to liquidate their stocks. Although the smell of gasoline is not so pervasive as before, boats still cross the Danube at night: The last deliveries are being made for Serbian customers. The Romanian smugglers are trying to find the best way to get rid of their barrels, containers, boats, and motors with the lowest possible losses. The most optimistic still hope that this suspension of the sanctions will be only temporary. On the Serbian bank, the few days that have passed have not brought much change. True, both private and state-owned gasoline stations are open now. Those belonging to the former category are open intermittently and they sell the gasoline for six dinars per liter, which equals 1.8 German marks [DM]. At the state-owned ones they sell the gasoline for 3.5 dinars (approximately DM1), but here people have to wait in line for days on end. Along the road from Stara Tekija to Belgrade, every second kilometer one can see racketeers selling gasoline in bottles and containers at between DM1.8 and DM1.2, with the price falling

as one approaches the Yugoslav capital. Nevertheless, being in the gasoline business is still profitable as long as in Romania the price of the stuff is 750 lei per liter, while in Yugoslavia it is almost three times higher.

Naturally, the few days that have gone by since the sanctions were suspended do not mean too much to Yugoslav citizens. The most spectacular thing, whose consequences cannot yet be predicted, occurred during the night of Saturday to Sunday [25-26 November], when, implementing the second stage of his economic program, Professor Dragoslav Avramovic, the governor of the national bank, announced a new rate of 3.3 dinars to the mark. What he actually did was make the black market exchange rate of the mark official. Avramovic announced that the new rate would not affect prices, but the Serbs are skeptical. Their optimism about the future is also very tempered. Asked about their expectations of how they will live in the near future with the sanctions lifted, most said that they did not foresee any spectacular changes to their standard of living. The reason for their ability to resist over the past three years is especially that approximately every fifth family has at least one member who was or is employed in the West. Apart from this, although, according to the official statistics, the average salary is 372 dinars, people working for large companies earn on average just 150-160 dinars per month. Pensions have not been paid since September.

Despite their economic reserves, in the days preceding the sanctions being lifted, the Yugoslav citizens had reached the end of their savings. No one here believes in a rapid recovery at either the micro- or the macroeconomic level. As a matter of fact, the new dinar exchange rate greatly stimulates the return home of Serbs who have accumulated capital abroad.

It is difficult to make a comparison between the standard of living of Romanians in the current transitional period and that of the Serbs, who are freshly emerging from sanctions. One thing is certain: Over the past years, the number of Romanians seeking work in Yugoslavia has never diminished. On the contrary, the number is still increasing. Here they pay DM10-15 per day to Romanian citizens for all sorts of jobs, from farming to building work. The DM200-300 earned in this way per month by our compatriots sometimes may seem as manna. On the other hand, the Serbs never miss any opportunity to go and work abroad, in Austria especially, where they earn 10 times more than they pay Romanians.

Anyway, these days here among ordinary people, one can see a certain restraint in their belief in the near future, as if the economic embargo had turned into an embargo on optimism.

Montenegro

Albanian Delegation Arrives To Discuss Trade

LD0412221295 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2100 GMT 4 Dec 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Dec. 4 (TANJUG) — A delegation from Albania arrived Monday on a two-day visit to Montenegro as of today Albania no longer applied sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The delegation head, Minister for Mineral Resources and Energy Abdul Xaja, and his host Montenegrin Minister for Industry, Energy and Mining Miodrag Gomilanovic noted that it was necessary within the framework of good-neighborly relations to promote bilateral cooperation between Montenegro and Albania.

The two sides, as set out in Podgorica, focused in talks on the possibilities for expansion of cooperation in the area of electrical supply, oil industry, mining and geology.

Reuters reported from Tirana that Albanian customs officials at the border-crossings with Yugoslavia — Shkoder, Kukesha and Qafe Prush, were instructed to discontinue applying sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and allow imports and exports.

An Albanian customs official set out that trade operations would begin in a few days, but that customs offices would have to be reopened at the border-crossings first.

Albania, Europe's poorest country, has registered a loss of one billion dollars since the imposition of anti-Yugoslav sanctions in May 1992.

The U.N. Security Council suspended comprehensive and binding sanctions indefinitely on Nov. 22 this year.

Kosovo

Commentary Urges 'Determination' on National Issue

AU0412070495 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian
2 Dec 95 p 2

[Commentary by Milazim Krasniqi: "Time for Determination and a Greater Clarity"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After the Dayton agreement that outline a solution for the western part of the ex-Yugoslavia, the question of Kosovo is slowly breaking through the diplomatic wall behind which it is being kept locked. The question of Kosovo is emerging as an issue that requires a solution if the creation of a

long-term peace in the most unstable region of the European continent is the aim. The formula of numerous diplomats that Kosovo has not been forgotten, apart from being simple diplomatic rhetoric with palliative effects for Albanians, bears in itself a project for a concrete commitment by the international community to resolve this crisis. The fact that the Kosovo issue has reached a level of internationalization is also testified by current orchestrated pronouncements by some high-level functionaries. [passage omitted]

It remains an evident fact that democratic Albania is supporting Kosovo and is engaging itself for a peaceful solution through initiating a Prishtina-Belgrade dialogue in the presence of a third party, that is, within the framework of the approved and official policy of Kosovo. The existence of a political consensus on the Kosovo issue among the political forces in the entire Albanian world is an attribute of great political and national values. This consensus also imposes the dimensions and seriousness of the Kosovo issue on a national level but also as a crisis with regional dimensions. The formula that if an ethnic cleansing occurs in Kosovo, Albanians will react as a nation, expresses this consensus and these dimensions. However, when it is a question of a more expressed determination, not only by the official policy but also by the opposition forces, certain limits and vacuums are observed. Some formulations such as "the democratic space for Albanians wherever they are," "an expanded autonomy," etc., have occurred too often. These are sensitive expressions of the relations toward the approved policy on the status of Kosovo as well as political moderations that express indetermination and an unclear position.

We cannot but say here that such expressions are based on the unique nature of the Albanian official and opposition policy in Kosovo. [passage omitted]

The process of breaking through the diplomatic wall behind which Kosovo is kept has already started. Undoubtedly, the credit for this goes to the policy and diplomacy of Kosovo and Albania which, not without toil, have created the groundwork to incorporate the question of Kosovo into the international agendas in order to achieve a just solution. However, the intensity of this process should be further assisted by the Albanians themselves, with determination and a greater clarity.

Suspension of UN Sanctions Causes 'Disillusion'*AU0312194695 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian
28 Nov 95 p 8*

[Unattributed report: "The Disappearance of Black Market and Increase of Looting"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The suspension of the UN sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro three years ago has been reflected in the economy of Kosovo in two directions. The social-state economy comprises the first, while the second is made up of the private economy. Before the UN Security Council sanctions were imposed, both these sectors were subject to Serbian sanctions imposed five years ago when Serbia abolished Kosovo's autonomy through violence and applied the violent measures in all the Kosovar factories, institutions, and staffs... Under these measures, the social-state sector was plundered, impoverished, and devastated, while the private sector anyway survived somewhat despite all the looting it went through. The application of the second sanctions, the UN sanctions, was another serious blow to Kosovo's wounded economy. During these double sanctions, the social-state economy, from which over 150,000 Albanian workers were sacked, was almost completely paralyzed, or in some exceptions it just vegetated, hoping for better days. The private economy, which employed approximately 20,000 workers, nevertheless saw a revival and efforts to survive. Around 16,000 firms, as our small economy numbers, mainly dealt with trade and very little with production. In the social-state sector, the Serbian power made a selection out of hundreds of staffs, factories, and enterprises, and oriented itself on four of them, in which it decided to invest so that they could resume production. These are: Trepca, Ferronickel, Electroconomy of Kosovo, and the Cement Factory in Han i Elezit. Preliminary preparations to activate them were made even before sanctions were suspended, but production has not resumed due to the fact that over 30,000 workers have been dismissed. It is not easy to find substitutes for their work places due to the simple fact that the means and credits for required investments are lacking.

Regarding the other staffs, the Serbian powerholders have neither material possibilities nor any intentions to reactivate them.

To begin with, following the sanctions, the Serbian authorities will be pleased if they could export from this sector what they could extract from Trepca, Ferronickel, Electroconomy of Kosovo, and the Cement Factory in Han i Elezit under the current conditions. The products of the Kosovar Agrocomplex, particularly the wines that have not been exported for four years now, are expected to be exported into European markets. The suspension of

sanctions will perhaps influence the social-state sector of the Kosovar economy to start communicating with the world markets only in some segments.

Meanwhile, the private economic sector is anticipating the suspension of sanctions as a possibility to communicate with the world markets without the burden of obstacles imposed by the United Nations. The Serbian sanctions that have engulfed this sector remain an even further unsurmountable obstacle for this sector. However, on an internal level, following the sanctions, several factors such as the fluctuation of the dinar, the abolition of quotas, and reduction of customs by 30 percent are observed which aim at liberalizing prices, exports and imports, and the domestic market. It will be easier for Kosovar private firms to import commodities, but it would be rather difficult to encounter the barriers of the Serbian power and its sanctions imposed only on Kosovo. The looting of goods, closing down of companies, pursuit of their owners, etc., will continue further. For a common citizen in Kosovo, the suspension of sanctions may be another valve left open under the Serbian occupation. The suspension of these sanctions blocks even those very few possibilities that enlivened a great deal of the Albanian population in Kosovo. Selling gasoline, cigarettes, food products, etc., commodities which the dismissed Albanian workers dealt with, perhaps will no longer be a job that will bring any profit. This means that, from now on, many families will be left with no incomes and under the mercy and alms of those who render and distribute aid. This will to a large extent make the so-called "black market" that kept alive so many Kosovar families disappear. The suspension of sanctions caused a disillusion in the public here for the fact that it was not conditioned to a solution to the Kosovo issue and also regarding the possibilities that the Serbian power will make use of.

Province's Value to Serbia Seen in Resources*AU0412095095 Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian
27 Nov 95 p 25*

[Besim Abazi article: "How Much Does Kosovo Cost?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In certain circles in Kosovo there is a very widespread opinion that Serbia, or rather its political leadership, is not so interested in settling relations with the local population, that is, the ethnic Albanian majority, and that Serbia would have recognized the ethnic Albanians' right to self-determination if this region had been desolate and barren. Such a theory is justified by the fact that Kosovo has cost the current Yugoslavia much, from the collapse of the former one until now. On one occasion, Skljezen Malici, an analyst from Kosovo, in one of his articles

"offered" \$5 billion to the authorities in Serbia and Yugoslavia to let the Kosovo Albanians organize their life according to their own criteria. Of course, this was just a joke, but there are more serious aspects to it.

Energy Supplies

So far many experts have tried to make an accurate assessment of Kosovo's resources, but it seems that the most serious one has been made by two Kosovo economists, Aziz Abrasi and Burban Kavaja. Experts in the situation in Kosovo probably remember these two, who were for a long time directors of some local big companies, including even the Trepca combine and precisely at the time of the most serious political crisis that happened in former Yugoslavia. In their analysis they say that Kosovo, although relatively small, has enough resources. First, they maintain, Kosovo is rich in potential energy sources, such as lignite, whose reserves, according to research carried out in the period from 1950 to 1960, were assessed to amount to 200 million metric tons. Subsequent research confirmed that the reserves amount to as much as 800 million metric tons, so on the basis of such results means of exploitation were built (Dobro Selo and Belacevac strip mines and Muhadzer Babus underground mine). At the same time, thermal power plants of 1478 MW [megawatt] capacity were built, then a heating plant of 41 MW capacity, a gas pipe network that produces 80,000 MBN [expansion unknown] of natural gas a year, and a drying kiln where 1.25 million metric tons of coal of various textures is processed a year. In addition to the energy-producing facilities, some of the chemical industry were built as well. Today 90 percent of lignite is used for production of electricity. The most recent research has confirmed that the lignite reserves amount to around 14.237 billion metric tons, which equals 2.296 billion metric tons of oil. The total value of energy potentials and facilities for coal exploitation, production of electricity, gas, fertilizers and other accompanying things amount to \$232.5 billion.

In the field of energy production, hydro-electric power plants alone are worth \$50 million.

Mines

Still, Kosovo's greatest asset are mines, which are known from ancient times, and which were exploited by many conquerors throughout history. Among non-ferrous ores, listed in order of quality and quantity, Kosovo is most rich in lead, zinc, potassium, bismuth, silver, gold, and some other rare metals, for instance, gallium. After all, it is enough to mention that in the 1950's one-fourth of Yugoslavia's total export was based on export of non-ferrous ores mined in Kosovo.

Reserves of lead and zinc made possible the building of means for their processing, as well as metallurgical facilities in Kosovska Mitrovica, Stari Trg, Kisinica, Ajvalija, Novo Brdo, Leposavic, Belo Brdo, and so forth. Reserves of non-ferrous ores are believed to amount to 200 million metric tons, including the A, B, C1, and C2 categories. The total value, according to the London Stock Exchange prices, amounts to \$20 billion. The existing facilities are big enough to process 2 million metric tons of ores a year. A particular place among resources belongs to the mines of ferrous nickel. They were being analyzed for quite a long time, and on that basis it was confirmed that the reserves amount to 21 million metric tons. For that reason mines and metallurgical capacities were opened in Glogovac. The total value of the reserves of this metal, as well as of the production capacities, is assessed to be \$3 billion. Reserves of non-metals are very important. Of 24 sorts that can be found in Kosovo, geological research was conducted on only 17 of them. The exploitation of those resources started relatively late, and on the basis of research so far, their value is believed to amount to \$7.9 billion.

Kosovo also abounds in timber forests, because, according to the reports submitted by 31 May 1985, 448,000 hectares are covered with timber, while the estimated value of this natural resource amounts to \$7 billion. On the other hand, the means built for exploitation of timber, alongside all accompanying facilities, are estimated at \$1 billion. Kosovo also has plenty of arable land. The estimated value, according to this research, is around \$120 billion.

Development

Although this is just a part of the entire value of resources, it is comprehensive enough to throw doubt on the Serbian myth of Kosovo and justifications that the only reason for Serbia's presence in Kosovo is to protect the cradle of Serbian civilization. Some local businessmen say that it is enough to remember Milosevic's words following his recent visit to Trepca, when he said that this giant was extremely important for the development not only of Serbia's southern province, but also of the whole of Serbia as well. At the same time the businessmen want to draw public attention to the typical phrase used by Serbian businessmen, who are advertising the revival of the Trepca mines thus: Trepca — the foundation of our future. Recently the executives of Trepca visited the mines of Novo Brdo and Ajvalija, and on that occasion the director of Ajvalija stated that this mine was the richest in Europe, adding that the only mine richer than this is the Broken Hill mine in faraway Australia.

"All this," former director of Ajvalija mine Abdulah Bektesi says, "proves that Serbia founds all its plans for economic development on Kosovo's resources."

"Particularly now," former politician Azem Vlasi underlines, "ruined by international sanctions and economically exhausted, Serbia is interested in Kosovo's last reserves of gold and silver."

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